Oligopoly and entry models are a family of theories in industrial economics that explain how prices and output are determined when a market has only a few sellers, and how the possibility of new firms entering affects incumbents' behaviour. In an oligopoly each firm's best choice depends on what its rivals do, so the models use the tools of game theory and, in most cases, the concept of Nash equilibrium.
The models differ in what firms choose (quantities, prices or locations) and in how easy entry is. Competition authorities use them to judge whether a merger or a market structure is likely to raise prices. They sit between the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly, and they show that the number of firms alone does not settle how competitive a market is.
Cournot Equilibrium
The Cournot model, set out by Antoine Augustin Cournot in 1838, assumes that firms produce an identical product and choose their output quantities simultaneously, and the market price then adjusts to clear the total supplied. A Cournot equilibrium, also called a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, is a set of outputs in which each firm's quantity is its best response to the others' quantities.
With two identical firms, linear demand and constant marginal cost , each firm produces:
Here is the demand intercept, the slope, total output and each firm's output. If , and , each firm makes 30 units, total output is 60 and the price is . That lies between the monopoly price of 55 and the competitive price of 10. As the number of firms rises, the Cournot price moves towards marginal cost.
Bertrand Competition
In the Bertrand model, proposed by Joseph Bertrand in 1883 as a critique of Cournot, firms set prices rather than quantities, and buyers purchase from whichever firm is cheapest. With an identical product, constant marginal cost and no capacity limits, any price above cost invites a rival to undercut slightly and take the whole market. The only Nash equilibrium is for price to equal marginal cost, even with just two firms.
This result, known as the Bertrand paradox, conflicts with the observation that a duopoly usually earns profits. It is resolved by relaxing the assumptions: if products are differentiated, if firms face capacity constraints, or if they compete repeatedly and can sustain tacit collusion, prices stay above cost. With capacity chosen first and prices second, the outcome can resemble Cournot. The contrast shows how much the predicted result depends on whether competition is in prices or quantities.
Spatial Competition
Spatial competition describes markets in which buyers care where a seller is located because travel or transport is costly, so each firm has some local market power over nearby customers. The foundational model is Harold Hotelling's linear city of 1929: customers are spread evenly along a street, and two sellers choose where to locate and what to charge.
When prices are fixed, Hotelling's model predicts that both sellers move to the centre of the street, an outcome called minimum differentiation that is used to explain why rival shops cluster and why political parties drift towards the centre. Later work showed that when firms also compete on price, they tend to move apart to soften price competition. The same framework is applied to product characteristics, not just geography, and is central to the analysis of monopolistic competition and of local markets in merger reviews.
Contestable Market
A contestable market is one in which entry is free and exit is costless, so that the threat of entry disciplines incumbents even if only one or a few firms are present. The theory was developed by William Baumol, John Panzar and Robert Willig and set out in their 1982 book on contestable markets.
The key condition is the absence of sunk costs. If an entrant can come in, undercut an incumbent charging high prices and leave again without loss, a strategy called hit-and-run entry, the incumbent must keep prices close to average cost. The theory was cited in support of airline deregulation in the United States, on the argument that aircraft could be moved between routes. Experience showed many sunk costs and barriers to entry, such as airport slots and hub networks, so few real markets are perfectly contestable, but the idea remains influential in competition policy.
Excess Capacity
Excess capacity exists when a firm produces less than the output at which its average cost would be lowest, or less than its plant could produce. In Edward Chamberlin's theory of monopolistic competition, long-run equilibrium with free entry leaves each firm on the downward-sloping part of its average cost curve, producing below minimum-cost output, a result known as the excess capacity theorem.
In entry models, excess capacity can also be strategic. An incumbent that invests in more capacity than it currently needs commits itself to expand output if a rival enters, which makes entry less profitable; models of this kind were developed by Michael Spence and Avinash Dixit. Competition authorities may examine such investment as possible exclusionary conduct. In macroeconomics, the related concept of capacity utilization measures how much of an economy's productive capacity is in use.
How the models compare
| Model | Firms choose | Typical prediction |
|---|---|---|
| Cournot | Quantities | Price above marginal cost, falling as firms are added |
| Bertrand | Prices | Price equal to marginal cost with identical products |
| Spatial (Hotelling) | Location and price | Local market power; clustering or spreading out |
| Contestable market | Prices, facing potential entrants | Average-cost pricing if entry and exit are free |
| Excess capacity | Capacity before entry | Spare capacity can deter entry |
Broader context is given in market structure and market power and collusive pricing practices.
Ref 1100001822