Strategies, payoffs and best responses are the core vocabulary of game theory, the study of decisions in which each person's outcome depends on what others choose. A strategy is a complete plan of action for a player; a payoff is what the player gets from an outcome; and a best response is the strategy that does best given what the others are doing. From these building blocks come the ideas of a dominant strategy and a Nash equilibrium.
The same terms are used across economics and finance: in models of oligopoly pricing, bank competition for deposits, central bank credibility, auctions and the adoption of payment networks. The sections below use one running example, a pricing game between two firms, each choosing a high or a low price. The last two sections describe how players' choices interact, as strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Different kinds of game are covered in types of games in game theory.
Payoff
A payoff is the value a player receives from a particular outcome of a game, given the strategies chosen by every player. It may be measured as profit, money, utility or any other ranking of outcomes the player cares about. In a game with two players and two strategies each, payoffs are set out in a payoff matrix: one player's strategies label the rows, the other's the columns, and each cell lists the payoffs to the row player and then the column player.
In the running example, two firms each choose a high or a low price, with profits in millions:
| Firm B: High | Firm B: Low | |
|---|---|---|
| Firm A: High | 10, 10 | 2, 12 |
| Firm A: Low | 12, 2 | 5, 5 |
If both charge high prices each earns 10; if one undercuts, it earns 12 and the other 2. In this sense the term is unrelated to a loan payoff or to the payoff diagram of an option.
Best Response
A best response is the strategy that gives a player the highest payoff, taking the other players' strategies as given. To find best responses in a payoff matrix, fix the other player's choice and compare the player's own payoffs down that column or along that row.
In the pricing game, suppose Firm B charges a high price. Firm A earns 10 by also charging high and 12 by charging low, so low is A's best response. If B charges low, A earns 2 from high and 5 from low, so low is again the best response. The game is symmetric, so B's best responses are the same. A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies in which every player's strategy is a best response to the others', so no one can gain by changing alone. Here the only Nash equilibrium is for both firms to charge low prices and earn 5 each, even though both would earn more by charging high, the structure of the prisoner's dilemma.
Dominant Strategy
A dominant strategy is one that gives a player a higher payoff than any alternative whatever the other players do. It is strictly dominant if it is always strictly better, and weakly dominant if it is never worse and sometimes better. A player with a dominant strategy does not need to predict others' choices.
In the pricing game, charging low is a strictly dominant strategy for both firms: it pays more whether the rival charges high (12 against 10) or low (5 against 2). When every player has a dominant strategy, the outcome is a dominant strategy equilibrium, which is always also a Nash equilibrium. The reverse is not true: many games have Nash equilibria but no dominant strategies, as in coordination games where the best choice depends entirely on what others do. This is why price-fixing cartels are fragile, since each member's dominant strategy is to undercut.
Strategic Complements
Actions are strategic complements when one player doing more of an action raises the benefit to other players of doing more of it too. Best responses then slope upwards: the more others do, the more each player wants to do. The terms strategic complements and strategic substitutes were introduced by Jeremy Bulow, John Geanakoplos and Paul Klemperer in 1985.
Examples include adopting a new technology or payment standard, where each user gains as more others adopt it because of network effects; price competition between firms selling differentiated products, where a rival's price rise makes a higher price more attractive; and bank runs, where each depositor's incentive to withdraw grows as more others withdraw. Games with strategic complements often have several equilibria, and outcomes can tip suddenly from one to another.
Strategic Substitutes
Actions are strategic substitutes when one player doing more of an action lowers the benefit to others of doing more. Best responses slope downwards: the more others do, the less each player wants to do.
The classic example is quantity competition in the Cournot model, named after Antoine Augustin Cournot (1838). If a rival firm expands output, the market price falls, so the best response is to produce less. Other examples include contributions to a public good, where each person is tempted to cut back when others give more, a pattern linked to the free-rider problem, and the decision to enter a crowded market. The distinction matters for strategy: with substitutes, committing early to an aggressive position, such as building extra capacity, can push rivals to retreat, while with complements an aggressive move tends to provoke one in return.
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