Anticompetitive business practices are forms of conduct by firms that reduce rivalry in a market and so tend to raise prices, cut output or slow innovation. They are the main concern of antitrust or competition law. Some involve agreements between competitors, known as horizontal practices; others involve agreements between firms at different stages of a supply chain, such as a manufacturer and its retailers, known as vertical practices; and some are the unilateral conduct of a firm with substantial market power.
Laws differ by country. In the United States the main statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914 and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, enforced by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. In the European Union, Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply, enforced by the European Commission; in the UK the Competition and Markets Authority plays the same role. Apart from hard-core cartels, most of the practices below are judged case by case, weighing harm against possible efficiencies.
Collusion
Collusion is cooperation between competitors to avoid competing, typically by fixing prices, limiting output, sharing out customers or territories, or rigging bids. Explicit collusion rests on an agreement, written or spoken; a formal, organised version is a cartel. Tacit collusion arises when firms in an oligopoly learn to match each other's prices without any agreement, which is generally harder to prohibit because there is no agreement to point to.
Price-fixing and bid-rigging agreements are treated as among the most serious competition offences in most jurisdictions, and in the United States they can be prosecuted as crimes. Collusion is also unstable. Each member gains by secretly undercutting the agreed price and taking extra sales, a temptation with the structure of the prisoner's dilemma. Cartels therefore need ways to monitor and punish cheating, and leniency programmes that reward the first member to confess are designed to make that harder.
Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing is the practice of setting prices below cost for a period in order to drive a rival out of the market or deter entry, with the aim of raising prices once competition has gone. It differs from ordinary price cutting, which benefits consumers, in its intent and in the later recovery of losses through higher prices.
The practice is hard to prove. Courts must distinguish low prices from aggressive but legitimate competition, and many economists argue that predation is rarely rational because the predator loses money on every sale and rivals can re-enter once prices rise. In the United States the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson requires a plaintiff to show both pricing below an appropriate measure of cost and a dangerous probability that the firm will recoup its losses. EU law, applied under Article 102 to dominant firms, does not require proof of recoupment and uses cost benchmarks such as average variable cost.
Exclusive Dealing
Exclusive dealing is an arrangement under which a buyer, such as a retailer or distributor, agrees to buy or sell only one supplier's products, or a supplier agrees to sell only to one buyer. Such contracts are common and often harmless: they can protect a supplier's investment in training or promoting a dealer and prevent rivals from free-riding on that investment.
Competition law becomes concerned when exclusive contracts tie up so much of a market that rivals cannot reach enough customers to compete, an effect called foreclosure. Authorities typically look at the share of the market covered, the length of the contracts, how easily buyers can switch, and whether the supplier holds a dominant position. In the United States exclusive dealing in goods falls under the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act and is assessed under the rule of reason. In the EU, exclusivity and loyalty rebates granted by a dominant firm have been challenged as abuses under Article 102.
Tying
Tying is selling one product, the tying product, only on condition that the buyer also takes a second, the tied product. It differs from product bundling, where goods are offered together as a package but are usually also available separately. Tying can lower costs or improve quality, but a firm with strong power over the tying product can use it to extend that power into the market for the tied product.
The best-known example is the Microsoft litigation. The US government's case, filed in 1998, included a claim that Microsoft illegally tied its Internet Explorer browser to Windows; in 2001 an appeals court ruled that such software tying should be judged under the rule of reason rather than condemned outright. The European Commission separately found in 2004 that tying Windows Media Player to Windows abused a dominant position. Banking has its own statutory restrictions, covered under anti-tying rules.
Resale Price Maintenance
Resale price maintenance (RPM) is an agreement under which a manufacturer requires its dealers to resell its products at, or above, a set minimum price; maximum resale prices are a separate and generally less controversial case. Supporters argue that minimum prices stop discount sellers free-riding on the advice and display provided by full-service retailers. Critics reply that RPM removes price competition between retailers and can help a manufacturer or a group of dealers sustain high prices.
The legal treatment varies. In the United States minimum RPM was illegal per se for almost a century after the 1911 Dr. Miles decision, until the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS (2007) moved it to the rule of reason under federal law, although some state laws remain stricter. In the EU, fixing minimum resale prices is treated as a hard-core restriction that is very rarely accepted, and UK law takes a similar approach.
Restrictive Practices
Restrictive practices is a broad term for business conduct that limits competition without amounting to a fully fledged cartel. It covers vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing, tying and resale price maintenance, as well as territorial restrictions on distributors, refusals to supply, information exchanges between competitors and restrictive trade association rules. In the UK the term also has a historical legal meaning: the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 required many such agreements to be registered and justified, a system later replaced by the Competition Act 1998.
Modern competition law generally assesses restrictive practices by their effects. Authorities ask whether the conduct raises barriers to entry, how large the firms' market share is, and whether efficiencies such as lower distribution costs are passed on to customers. Practices that pass this test are allowed, often under block exemptions or safe harbours for firms with small shares.
How the practices compare
| Practice | Type | Usual legal approach |
|---|---|---|
| Collusion (price-fixing, bid-rigging) | Horizontal agreement | Prohibited outright in most jurisdictions |
| Predatory pricing | Unilateral, by a dominant firm | Effects-based, with cost tests |
| Exclusive dealing | Vertical agreement | Rule of reason; foreclosure test |
| Tying | Vertical or unilateral | Depends on market power and effects |
| Resale price maintenance | Vertical agreement | Rule of reason in US federal law; hard-core restriction in the EU |
External links
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