The lending practices behind the subprime crisis were a chain of decisions, from borrower to bond investor, that let weak US mortgages grow quickly in the early and mid-2000s and then spread losses through the financial system. Lenders extended subprime mortgages to borrowers with poor credit, often without checking income, and sold the loans on to be packaged into mortgage-backed securities. Bond insurers then guaranteed some of the resulting securities, lending them high credit ratings.
When house prices began to fall in 2006 and 2007, defaults rose, securities lost value and the insurers' guarantees came into doubt, contributing to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. The four parts of the chain covered below, subprime borrowers, liar loans, the originate-to-distribute model and monoline insurers, show how incentives at each step pushed risk onward.
Subprime Borrower
A subprime borrower is a borrower whose credit history suggests a higher chance of default than a prime borrower, and who therefore pays a higher interest rate or faces stricter terms. Signs include a low credit score, late payments, past defaults or bankruptcy, and high debt relative to income. There is no single legal cut-off. Lenders and regulators have often treated a FICO score below about 620 as subprime, but the line varies by lender and product, and terms such as near-prime cover the band in between. Subprime lending can widen access to credit for people that banks once turned away. In the 2000s, however, many subprime mortgages combined weak credit with high loan-to-value ratios and adjustable rates that reset higher after two or three years. When rates reset and house prices stopped rising, many borrowers could neither pay nor refinance, and delinquencies climbed sharply from 2007.
Liar Loan
A liar loan is a slang name for a mortgage made with little or no verification of the borrower's income or assets, so that the borrower, or sometimes the broker, could overstate them. Formal names included stated-income, low-documentation and no-documentation loans, and many were classed as Alt-A, a band between prime and subprime. Such loans were first meant for self-employed people with irregular but real income. During the housing boom of the mid-2000s they spread widely to ordinary wage earners, and later studies found that stated incomes were often far above what borrowers actually earned. Because lenders sold the loans on, they had little reason to check. After the crisis the Dodd-Frank Act directed regulators to require lenders to make a reasonable, good-faith judgement of a borrower's ability to repay. The resulting ability-to-repay rule, in force since January 2014, requires lenders to verify income using reliable records, which largely ended this kind of lending.
Originate-to-Distribute Model
The originate-to-distribute model is a way of lending in which a bank or mortgage company makes loans in order to sell them, usually for securitization, rather than keeping them on its own balance sheet. The traditional alternative, the originate-to-hold model, leaves the lender bearing any losses, which gives it a strong reason to screen borrowers carefully. Under originate-to-distribute, the lender earns fees when the loan is made and sold, while the risk passes to investors in mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. The model spreads risk and can lower the cost of credit, but in the 2000s it weakened screening, a form of moral hazard, because each link in the chain was paid for volume rather than quality. Post-crisis reforms responded with risk retention rules requiring securitizers to keep part of the credit risk, usually 5%, so they share in losses.
Monoline Insurer
A monoline insurer is an insurance company that writes only one line of business: guaranteeing that the issuer of a bond will pay interest and principal on time. If the issuer defaults, the insurer pays investors instead. The best-known US monolines were MBIA and Ambac. Their main business began with municipal bond insurance, where a guarantee let a small town's bond carry the insurer's AAA rating and so pay a lower interest rate. From the late 1990s the monolines increasingly wrapped structured products, including securities backed by subprime mortgages, a form of credit enhancement. When those securities suffered large losses in 2007 and 2008, the insurers faced claims far larger than their capital. Rating agencies downgraded them in 2008, which in turn downgraded every bond they had guaranteed and forced banks that had bought protection from them to book further losses. The guarantee-backed AAA model never fully recovered.
How the practices fitted together
| Practice | Who gained up front | Who bore the risk |
|---|---|---|
| Subprime lending | Borrowers gaining access to credit; lenders earning higher rates | Borrowers facing payment resets; later, investors |
| Liar loans | Brokers and lenders paid on volume | Investors in the securities |
| Originate-to-distribute | Originators and arrangers earning fees | Holders of mortgage-backed securities and CDOs |
| Monoline insurance | Issuers getting AAA ratings; insurers earning premiums | The insurers, then banks and investors relying on their guarantees |
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