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Securitisation Risk Retention

Legal Law and EnforcementUpdated 17 Nov 2026

Securitisation risk retention is the requirement that the originator, sponsor or original lender of a securitisation keep a material share of the credit risk of the assets it securitises, so that its interests stay aligned with those of investors. The main rules in the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States set the share at 5% and forbid the retainer from hedging or selling the retained exposure.

The rules respond to the originate-to-distribute model blamed for weak lending standards before the 2008 financial crisis, when lenders could sell almost all the risk of loans they made, including subprime mortgages. Keeping skin in the game is meant to reduce the moral hazard of lending without regard to repayment. Retention is one of several post-crisis reforms of securitisation, alongside rules on disclosure, investor due diligence and bank capital.

01

European Union and United Kingdom

In the EU, the requirement sits in Article 6 of the Securitisation Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, which has applied since 1 January 2019. It places a direct obligation on the originator, sponsor or original lender to retain, on an ongoing basis, a material net economic interest of not less than 5%. Institutional investors must also check, under Article 5, that retention is in place before they invest, so a deal that breaches the rule is hard to sell to EU banks, insurers and funds. Detailed rules are set out in regulatory technical standards developed by the European Banking Authority.

An entity set up only to hold the retained piece does not qualify as an originator. The rules aim to stop a sponsor from creating a shell retainer with no real business, which would defeat the purpose of retention.

The UK kept the EU regime after leaving the EU and has since moved its detailed securitisation rules, including retention, into the rulebooks of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. The 5% level and the main retention methods remain broadly the same as in the EU.

02

United States

In the US, Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act added a credit risk retention requirement to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission and housing agencies adopted a joint rule, known in the SEC's version as Regulation RR, which requires the sponsor to retain at least 5% of the credit risk. Unlike the EU regime, the US rule has no matching duty on investors to check compliance. Exemptions cover qualified residential mortgages, whose definition is tied to the qualified mortgage standard, some other high-quality loans and securitisations guaranteed by federal agencies. In 2018 a US federal appeals court held that managers of open-market collateralised loan obligations are not sponsors under the statute, removing those deals from the rule.

03

Methods of retention

Both regimes allow several ways to hold the required interest:

  • Vertical slice. The retainer holds at least 5% of each tranche, from the senior tranche down, sharing losses pro rata with investors.
  • Horizontal or first loss. The retainer holds the most junior position, such as the equity tranche, sized at 5% or more. In the US this is the eligible horizontal residual interest, measured at fair value.
  • L-shaped. A combination of vertical and horizontal holdings that together reach 5%.
  • Seller's share. For revolving pools such as credit card trusts, the originator holds an interest of at least 5% in the pool alongside investors.
  • Random selection. In the EU, the retainer may keep randomly selected exposures equal to at least 5% of the securitised amount, provided the pool is large enough.

Retention generally applies for the life of the transaction, though the US rule lets the restrictions on transfer and hedging end after set periods for some asset classes.

04

Criticism and practical effects

Supporters argue that retention ties originators to the quality of their loans. Critics note that many originators already held large first-loss positions before the crisis and still suffered heavy losses, that the 5% level is arbitrary, and that the rules raise costs for smaller originators and for structures where no party clearly fits the definition of originator or sponsor. Differences between the EU, UK and US regimes also complicate cross-border deals, which may need to comply with more than one set of rules. Retention is separate from the significant risk transfer test, which concerns how much risk a bank must pass on to gain capital relief, but the two interact in a synthetic risk transfer or other synthetic securitisation, where the bank keeps part of the risk and transfers the rest.

Last updated 17 Nov 2026