A financial crisis is a sudden and severe disruption of the financial system in which confidence collapses, asset prices fall sharply, financial institutions fail or lose access to funding, and the flow of credit to households and firms contracts. Crises typically begin when investors and depositors rush to convert risky or illiquid claims into cash or the safest assets, forcing lenders to sell assets and cut lending. The damage often spreads well beyond finance into output and employment.
The term covers several kinds of event, including banking crises, currency crises and sovereign debt crises, which often occur together. Major examples include the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, and the 2008 financial crisis. Central banks, finance ministries, deposit insurers and international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund lead the response. Influential accounts include Charles Kindleberger's Manias, Panics, and Crashes (1978) and Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff's This Time Is Different (2009).
Types of financial crisis
Economists usually distinguish the following kinds of crisis, which frequently overlap:
- Banking crises. Depositors or wholesale lenders withdraw funds, banks fail or need rescue, and lending shrinks. A bank panic occurs when runs spread across many banks at once.
- Currency crises. A currency crisis involves a sharp fall in the exchange rate or the collapse of a fixed peg, often after a sudden stop in foreign capital inflows.
- Sovereign debt crises. A government cannot or may not service its debt, as discussed under sovereign debt crisis.
- Asset-price crashes. The bursting of an economic bubble in shares or property wipes out wealth and collateral.
When a banking crisis and a currency crisis occur together, as in several Asian economies in 1997, they are called twin crises. Thailand's decision to float the baht in July 1997 set off a chain of devaluations and bank failures across the region, and the countries worst hit turned to the IMF for support. Studies of many such episodes find that output typically takes several years to recover after a systemic banking crisis, and that public debt tends to rise sharply as tax revenue falls and governments support the banks.
Causes and dynamics
Most crises follow a period of rapid credit growth and rising leverage. Optimism raises asset prices, which makes borrowers look safer and encourages more lending. Hyman Minsky argued that stability itself breeds instability, because long calm periods lead lenders to accept ever riskier positions until a Minsky moment arrives and borrowers must sell assets to meet their debts.
Crises are triggered by a shock that exposes weak balance sheets: a fall in house prices, a large default, a rise in interest rates or the failure of a major firm. Because banks fund long-term, illiquid loans with short-term deposits, a loss of confidence can force even solvent institutions to fail. Interconnections between institutions spread losses, creating systemic risk. In 2007–08 losses on subprime mortgages spread through securitised products and short-term funding markets, including shadow banking.
Financial Accelerator
The financial accelerator is a feedback loop through which changes in borrowers' wealth amplify swings in the economy. When asset prices rise, households and firms have more collateral and stronger balance sheets, so lenders charge them less and lend them more, which boosts spending and pushes asset prices higher still. When prices fall, the process runs in reverse: collateral shrinks, borrowing costs rise, spending is cut and prices fall further.
The mechanism was formalised by Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist in work during the 1990s, building on the idea that lending is costlier when lenders cannot fully observe borrowers. It helps explain why modest shocks can produce large business cycles and why the fall in US house prices from 2006 had such a large effect on spending. The accelerator also works through banks: losses reduce bank capital, which forces lenders to cut credit, producing a credit crunch.
Fire Sale
A fire sale is a forced sale of assets at prices well below their fundamental value because the seller urgently needs cash. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny argued in 1992 that the natural buyers of an asset, firms in the same industry, are often in difficulty at the same moment, so forced sellers must accept low prices from outsiders who value the asset less.
In financial markets, fire sales arise when leveraged investors face a margin call, when funds meet heavy redemptions or when lenders raise the haircut on collateral. Sales depress prices, which reduces the value of collateral held by others and triggers further sales: a fire-sale spiral. In 2008 such spirals affected mortgage-backed securities and other assets financed in repo markets. Deleveraging across the system turns individual distress into a market-wide fall, which is why central banks sometimes act as buyer or lender against these assets.
Policy responses
Since Walter Bagehot's Lombard Street (1873), the classic prescription has been for the central bank to act as lender of last resort, lending freely to solvent institutions against good collateral at a penalty rate. Modern responses also include deposit insurance to prevent runs, government recapitalisation of banks, guarantees on bank debt, and asset purchase schemes such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the United States in 2008. Central banks cut interest rates and, when rates approach zero, buy assets through quantitative easing.
Rescues raise concerns about moral hazard, since institutions that expect support may take more risk. After 2008, reforms under Basel III raised bank capital and liquidity requirements, and resolution regimes were designed to let large banks fail without taxpayer bailouts, addressing the problem of firms seen as too big to fail.
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