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Variation Margin Gains Haircutting

Financial InfrastructureUpdated 16 Nov 2026

Variation margin gains haircutting (VMGH) is a loss allocation tool that a central counterparty (CCP) can use when its prefunded resources have been exhausted after a member default. Instead of paying the full variation margin owed to members whose positions have gained in value, the CCP pays only part of it. The amount withheld covers the loss the CCP cannot otherwise meet, so the burden falls on those who were due to receive money, in proportion to their gains.

VMGH sits near the end of the loss allocation waterfall. It is used after the defaulter's margin and default fund contribution, the CCP's own capital and the surviving members' default fund contributions have been consumed, and usually alongside or after default fund assessments and cash calls. It appears both in CCP rulebooks as a recovery tool and in resolution regimes as a power available to the authorities.

01

How VMGH works

Each day a CCP collects variation margin from members whose positions have lost value and pays it to members whose positions have gained. In normal times the two sides balance. When a member defaults and its losses exceed all available resources, the CCP collects less than it owes, because the defaulter does not pay. VMGH closes the gap by reducing every payment due to members with net gains by the same percentage, while members with losses still pay in full.

The haircut rate for a period is:

h=LGh = \frac{L}{G}

and each member receives:

Pi=Gi×(1−h)P_i = G_i \times (1 - h)
  • hh is the haircut rate, between 0 and 1.
  • LL is the uncovered loss the CCP must allocate in the period.
  • GG is the total variation margin gains owed to all members with gains.
  • GiG_i is the gain owed to member ii, and PiP_i is the amount actually paid.

For example, suppose a CCP has an uncovered loss of 300 million and owes gains of 600 million to member A, 300 million to member B and 100 million to member C, a total of 1,000 million. The haircut rate is h=300/1,000=0.30h = 300/1{,}000 = 0.30. A receives 420 million, B 210 million and C 70 million, a total of 700 million, so the 300 million shortfall is absorbed. Rules usually allow VMGH to be applied over several days during the default management process, often subject to a cap or time limit, and the amounts withheld may carry a claim on later recoveries.

02

Rules and regulation

CPMI-IOSCO guidance on the recovery of financial market infrastructures lists VMGH among the tools a CCP may use to allocate uncovered losses, and expects the tool to be set out transparently in its rules and its FMI recovery plan. The Financial Stability Board's guidance on CCP resolution also discusses VMGH as a resolution tool.

In the European Union, the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation provides for VMGH as part of a CCP's recovery plan and gives resolution authorities a power to apply it, alongside cash calls, as a position and loss allocation tool. Use in resolution is subject to safeguards, including the principle that no creditor should be left worse off than in normal insolvency. The UK has introduced its own CCP resolution regime, run by the Bank of England, and some US CCP rulebooks also include gains-haircutting provisions. Further detail on resolution powers is under FMI resolution planning.

03

Advantages and criticism

Supporters argue that VMGH has useful features. It draws on cash the CCP already holds, so it does not require members to find new liquidity in a crisis. It falls on those who have gained from market moves, which in a stressed market are often the parties best able to bear a loss. It also preserves the CCP's matched book, unlike tearing up contracts, and leaves positions in place.

Critics point to several problems:

  • Uncertainty. The size of the loss each member bears depends on market moves it cannot control and is hard to model in advance.
  • Impact on hedgers. End clients, such as pension funds using derivatives to hedge liabilities, may find that the gains offsetting losses elsewhere are cut, weakening their hedge just when it is needed.
  • Pass-through. Whether haircuts are passed on to clients depends on clearing agreements between each clearing member and its clients, which vary.
  • Procyclicality. Large haircuts in a stressed market may reduce confidence in the CCP and encourage members to reduce activity.

Because of these concerns, many CCPs limit the period or the total amount of VMGH, and both CCPs and members prefer to resolve a default earlier in the waterfall, through hedging and a successful default management auction. The design of VMGH and the size of CCPs' own skin-in-the-game contribution remain points of debate between CCPs, members and clients.

Last updated 16 Nov 2026