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FMI Resolution Planning

Financial InfrastructureUpdated 16 Nov 2026

FMI resolution planning is the work done by a resolution authority, in advance of any crisis, to prepare for the orderly resolution of a financial market infrastructure (FMI) whose recovery has failed or would not restore viability. Its aim is to keep the FMI's critical services available, protect financial stability and avoid exposing taxpayers to loss, while allocating losses in a way that is predictable and fair. The work produces a resolution plan, an assessment of how resolvable the FMI is, and arrangements for cooperation among the authorities involved.

Resolution differs from recovery in who acts. Under an FMI recovery plan, the FMI's own management uses tools in its rules. In resolution, the authority takes control and can use statutory powers that go beyond the rules, overriding contracts where necessary. Resolution planning for FMIs draws on the broader framework for resolution planning developed for banks after the 2007 to 2009 crisis, but adapts it to infrastructures whose services cannot easily be replaced.

01

International standards

The Financial Stability Board's Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, first issued in 2011 and updated in 2014, include an annex on the resolution of FMIs and FMI participants. It requires jurisdictions to have a resolution authority with powers suited to FMIs and states that an FMI's rules and the resolution regime together must be capable of allocating all losses. The Board's 2017 guidance on central counterparty resolution and resolution planning set out more detailed expectations for central counterparties (CCPs), the type of FMI that has received most attention because it concentrates counterparty credit risk.

For CCPs that are systemically important in more than one jurisdiction, authorities form crisis management groups, carry out resolvability assessments and agree cooperation arrangements, because the members, clearing services and collateral of a large CCP are spread across many countries.

02

Resolution powers and tools

A resolution regime for FMIs typically gives the authority power to:

  • Take control of the FMI, replace management and use its default management and loss-allocation rules, including those the FMI has not yet used.
  • Allocate further losses to participants through tools such as variation margin gains haircutting and cash calls, subject to limits.
  • Restore a matched book by terminating contracts, including through portfolio termination of a clearing service.
  • Write down equity and, where relevant, other instruments, in the manner of bail-in.
  • Transfer critical services to a third party or to a bridge institution owned by the authority.
  • Impose a temporary stay on early termination rights that could otherwise be triggered by resolution.

A safeguard known as no creditor worse off compares each participant's outcome with what it would have received had the FMI been wound up without resolution. For CCPs, the FSB's guidance expects this comparison to take account of the full application of the CCP's own rules, so that participants cannot claim compensation for losses those rules already imposed.

03

Planning in practice

A resolution plan starts by identifying the FMI's critical functions, described under FMI service criticality, and the scenarios that could lead to resolution, both default losses and non-default losses such as investment, custody or cyber losses. The authority then assesses whether the FMI's resources and its own tools are enough, what additional financial resources would be needed, and how equity holders would absorb losses before participants. FSB guidance from 2020 addressed the financial resources available to support CCP resolution and the treatment of CCP equity.

Operational continuity is as important as loss allocation. The plan must show that staff, systems, critical service providers and links with other FMIs would continue during resolution, and that participants can continue to access the FMI. A related FSB guidance from 2017 asks FMIs not to terminate a participant's access merely because that participant entered resolution, so that resolving a bank does not cut it off from payment and settlement systems.

04

Regional frameworks

In the European Union, the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation designates national resolution authorities, requires resolution plans for every CCP, sets up resolution colleges, and provides tools including position and loss allocation, write-down and conversion, sale of business and a bridge CCP. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England (BoE) is the resolution authority for CCPs. In the United States, a failing systemically important CCP could be resolved under the orderly liquidation authority in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. Infrastructures that are not CCPs, such as CSDs and payment systems, are covered unevenly across jurisdictions, often through special administration regimes rather than full resolution powers.

Resolution planning thus complements the FMI wind-down plan, which covers services that can be closed safely, and the wider effort to reduce systemic risk from infrastructures that are too central to fail.

Last updated 16 Nov 2026