A default management auction is the sale, by a central counterparty (CCP), of the positions of a clearing member that has defaulted. Because a CCP stands between buyer and seller in every cleared trade, a member's default leaves it with one side of each of that member's positions and an unbalanced book. The auction transfers those positions to surviving members, who bid for them, so that the CCP's book is matched again and its exposure to market movements ends.
The auction is the central step in central counterparty default management, which also covers declaring the default, porting client positions and hedging. Its result determines the size of any loss: if the price paid to transfer the portfolio is covered by the defaulter's margin and default fund contribution, the default is absorbed without touching other members' money. The international standard for CCPs, the CPMI-IOSCO PFMI (Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures), requires them to have tested procedures to close out a defaulter's positions promptly, and auctions are the usual method for over-the-counter and large futures portfolios.
Preparing the portfolio
Before the auction, the CCP usually reduces the portfolio's market risk by hedging, so that its value changes less while bidders assess it. Hedges may be traded in the market or, in some services, acquired through a hedge auction. The CCP then splits the portfolio into lots, typically by currency, product or risk factor, so that each lot can be priced by members specialising in it. The default management group, made up of traders seconded from members, advises on hedging, lot design and timing.
Simple, liquid positions in exchange-traded futures can often be closed by selling them in the market. Large or illiquid portfolios, such as swaps or options books, are auctioned because selling them openly would move prices against the CCP. An auction of a single block of positions is also described as a position auction.
How bidding works
The CCP invites eligible members, and in some services their clients, to bid for each lot within a short window, often a few hours. Bids are usually sealed and quoted as a single amount that the bidder will pay to receive the lot, or will be paid to take it. A portfolio with negative value to its holder attracts negative bids, meaning the CCP pays the winner. Bidders price in the cost of hedging the lot, the margin they will have to post and the risk of holding it in a stressed market, so bids are usually less favourable to the CCP than the theoretical mid-market value. The best bid wins, and the lot's positions are booked to the winner's account at the CCP once the auction closes.
Many CCPs oblige members to take part under an auction participation requirement. To encourage competitive bids, rulebooks often juniorise the default fund contributions of members that bid poorly or not at all, so that those contributions absorb any remaining loss first. Some CCPs also reward the best bidders by protecting part of their contributions.
When an auction fails
An auction fails if no bids are received for a lot or if the winning bids would cost more than the resources available. The CCP can rerun it with redesigned lots or after further hedging. If losses remain after the defaulter's resources, they pass through the rest of the default waterfall allocation, including the CCP's own capital and surviving members' contributions to the clearing fund. Beyond that, recovery tools may be used, such as variation margin gains haircutting, forced allocation of positions or partial termination of contracts.
Experience and lessons
Auctions have been used in several notable defaults. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, clearing houses hedged and auctioned the firm's cleared portfolios, including a very large interest rate swap book, without drawing on other members' default fund contributions. The auctions showed that a well-prepared default procedure could handle the failure of a major dealer.
In 2018, the default of an individual trader in the Nordic power derivatives market showed the limits of auctions in concentrated markets. The defaulter's position was large relative to the market, few members could bid, and the auction result led to losses that exceeded his margin and used part of the mutualised default fund. The case prompted reviews of concentration add-ons to initial margin and of auction design. International standard setters have since issued guidance on the design and testing of default auctions, and CCPs rehearse them with members through regular default simulations.