The theory of the second best is the proposition in welfare economics that, when one of the conditions needed for an efficient outcome cannot be met, it is generally no longer desirable to meet the others. In other words, if one distortion in the economy must stay, removing a second distortion may make society worse off rather than better off. The best achievable outcome under the remaining constraint, the "second best", may require deliberate departures from the textbook rules of efficiency.
The general result was set out by Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster in their 1956 article "The General Theory of Second Best", building on earlier work by Jacob Viner on customs unions and James Meade on trade policy. It is a qualification of the first-best benchmark of Pareto efficiency and perfect competition, and it shapes how economists think about piecemeal reform.
The core idea
In a first-best world, with no market failure, efficiency requires that price equals marginal cost in every market. Each such condition is optimal only because all the others hold too. If one market is permanently distorted, by a monopoly, a tax or an externality, the other markets are linked to it through substitution and complementarity, so the best response in those markets changes.
The theorem does not say what the second-best policy is; it says only that the first-best rules cannot be relied on. The right answer depends on the details of the economy, which makes the theory a warning against assuming that any move towards competitive conditions is automatically an improvement.
Worked example: a customs union
Viner's analysis of a customs union is the classic illustration. Suppose a country imports a good from the cheapest world producer at a cost of 10 per unit and charges a 50% tariff, so the domestic price is 15. It then forms a customs union with a partner that produces the good at 12. Imports from the partner now enter duty-free at 12, which is cheaper for buyers than 15, so the partner takes over the market.
The welfare effect on the existing imports can be measured per unit:
Consumers pay 3 less per unit (15 minus 12), but the government loses tariff revenue of 5 per unit (50% of 10), so on the existing volume the country loses per unit, exactly the extra resource cost of buying from a less efficient producer. This is trade diversion. Lower prices may also raise the quantity bought, which is a gain, so the net effect depends on the sizes involved. Removing one barrier, the tariff on the partner, while keeping the tariff on the rest of the world can lower welfare even though it looks like a step towards free trade.
Applications in policy
The theory appears wherever reform is partial:
- Trade policy. Regional deals such as a free trade area can divert trade, as in the example above, so economists assess them case by case rather than assuming they help.
- Pollution and monopoly. A monopolist that pollutes already produces too little. A pollution tax set at the full marginal damage would cut output further and could reduce welfare, so the second-best tax may be lower than the damage.
- Tax reform. With an income tax already distorting labour supply, a uniform commodity tax is not automatically best; optimal tax theory, which studies deadweight loss and tax incidence, often calls for differentiated rates.
- Regulation. Price controls on a natural monopoly, or subsidies in one sector, change what is efficient in neighbouring sectors.
Criticism and significance
The theory is sometimes criticised as too negative: if almost any reform could backfire, it seems to justify doing nothing, or to give cover to special pleading for protection. Defenders reply that it is a call for analysis rather than paralysis. Later work identified conditions under which piecemeal reform does help, for example cutting the largest distortion first or reducing all distortions proportionally.
The theory also overlaps with ideas such as X-inefficiency and allocative efficiency, and it underpins modern cost-benefit methods that use "shadow prices" to value goods in distorted economies. Its lasting lesson is that economic efficiency is a property of the whole system, so reforms should be judged by their combined effects rather than one market at a time.
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