Natural monopoly and its regulation covers industries in which a single supplier is the cheapest way to serve a market, and the rules governments use to stop that supplier from exploiting its position. Water mains, electricity and gas networks, railway track and local telecommunications lines are standard examples. Because a second network would duplicate huge fixed investments, competition between rival networks is wasteful, yet an unregulated monopoly would charge high prices and restrict output.
Governments respond in three main ways: public ownership, through nationalization or municipal utilities; competitive franchising, in which firms bid for the right to serve; or regulation of a private owner. Regulators in turn rely on two broad price-control methods, cost-plus regulation and price cap regulation, which differ mainly in how they reward the firm for cutting costs. The same reasoning applies to some payment and market infrastructure, such as a national interbank network.
Natural Monopoly
A natural monopoly exists when one firm can produce the total output a market demands at a lower average cost than two or more firms could. This usually happens when fixed costs are very large and the cost of serving each extra customer is small, so strong economies of scale continue over the whole range of demand. Average cost is:
Here is the fixed cost, is output and is the constant marginal cost. With and , one firm serving 200,000 customers has . Two firms splitting the market, 100,000 each, both have . Because marginal cost lies below average cost, a firm told to price at marginal cost, as in perfect competition, would make a loss. This is why natural monopolies are usually regulated rather than broken up.
Cost-Plus Regulation
Cost-plus regulation, often called rate-of-return regulation in the United States, sets the prices of a regulated monopoly so that its revenue covers its operating costs plus a fair return on the capital it has invested. The regulator reviews the firm's accounts, decides which costs are reasonable, values the capital base and sets an allowed rate of return, usually linked to the firm's cost of capital. Prices are then reset in periodic rate cases. The method protects consumers from excess profits and gives investors confidence, which suits industries needing heavy, long-lived investment. Its main weakness is incentive: because savings are passed on to customers at the next review, the firm gains little from cutting costs. Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson showed in 1962 that a firm earning an allowed return on capital may also over-invest in capital, an outcome known as the Averch-Johnson effect. Reviews are also costly and depend on information that the firm knows better than the regulator.
Price Cap Regulation
Price cap regulation sets a maximum price, or average price for a basket of services, that a monopoly may charge over a period of several years. In the British form, prices may rise each year by an inflation index minus an efficiency factor, often written RPI minus X:
Here is the capped price this year, is last year's price, RPI is inflation measured by the Retail Prices Index and is the required real price cut, both written as decimals. With RPI at 3 per cent and at 2 per cent, a price of £100 may rise to £101, since . The approach was proposed by the economist Stephen Littlechild and first used for British Telecom after its privatisation in 1984, then for UK water, gas and electricity. Because the firm keeps any savings beyond X until the next review, it has a strong incentive to cut costs. Risks include cutting quality or investment to raise profit, so caps usually come with service standards.
Cost-plus and price cap regulation compared
| Feature | Cost-plus (rate-of-return) | Price cap (RPI minus X) |
|---|---|---|
| What the regulator fixes | Allowed return on capital | Maximum price path |
| Incentive to cut costs | Weak | Strong between reviews |
| Risk borne by the firm | Low | Higher |
| Main danger | Waste and over-investment | Lower quality or investment |
| Typical setting | US utility commissions | UK and European network regulators |
In practice the two have converged. Price caps are reset using cost and capital information, while many US regulators add performance incentives to rate-of-return rules. A related topic is the legal monopoly, where exclusivity comes from law rather than cost conditions.
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