Reserve currency debates and reform proposals are the set of ideas used to describe, criticise and try to improve the international monetary system, in which the US dollar has been the main reserve currency since the Second World War. Some of the terms describe how the system works, such as the benefits to the United States or the borrowing limits of poorer countries. Others are reform plans, from a world currency to an IMF account for swapping dollars.
The debates are old. Keynes's wartime plans, the Triffin dilemma of the 1960s and the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 all raised the same question: whether one country's currency can serve the whole world safely. Interest revived after the Asian crisis of 1997 and the global financial crisis of 2008. The sections below cover the main descriptive ideas first, then the reform proposals and the crisis insurance that has grown up around the dollar.
Exorbitant Privilege
Exorbitant privilege is the phrase used for the advantages the United States gains from issuing the world's main reserve currency. It is usually attributed to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, French finance minister in the 1960s, whose government under Charles de Gaulle objected to the dollar's role. Because foreign central banks, firms and investors want to hold dollars and US Treasury securities, the United States can borrow more cheaply than it otherwise could, and it can run current account deficits financed by debts in its own currency. It also earns seigniorage on dollar banknotes held abroad. A depreciation of the dollar lowers the real value of US liabilities while raising the dollar value of US assets abroad, many of them in foreign currencies. Some economists add that the privilege comes with a duty: in crises the United States acts as the world's supplier of dollar liquidity, as the Federal Reserve did through swap lines in 2008 and 2020.
Bretton Woods II
Bretton Woods II is the hypothesis, set out in 2003 by Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber, that the world economy had recreated a version of the original Bretton Woods arrangement. In their view, emerging Asian economies, above all China, kept their currencies pegged or managed against the dollar to support export-led growth, and they invested the resulting reserves in US assets. The United States, as the centre country, ran large deficits and enjoyed cheap financing, much as Europe and Japan had relied on dollar pegs in the 1950s and 1960s. The authors argued the arrangement could last for many years because both sides benefited. Critics replied that the growing global imbalances were unsustainable, that the reserve holders faced large losses if the dollar fell, and that China's later move to a more flexible exchange rate weakened the analogy. The debate remains a standard reference in discussions of reserve accumulation.
Original Sin
Original sin is the term Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann introduced in 1999 for the inability of many countries to borrow abroad, or to borrow long term at home, in their own currency. Such countries must borrow in dollars or another major currency, which creates a currency mismatch: their revenues are in local currency while their debts are in foreign currency. A depreciation then raises the burden of debt just when the economy is weakest, which made the emerging market crises of the 1990s much worse. The authors argued the problem stemmed largely from the structure of global markets rather than only from poor policies, so countries could not escape it on their own. Since the 2000s many emerging markets have developed local-currency bond markets that foreigners buy. Agustín Carstens and Hyun Song Shin of the BIS later described a new form, "original sin redux": currency risk shifts to foreign investors, whose sales in a downturn can still destabilise local markets.
Reserve Accumulation
Reserve accumulation is the build-up of foreign exchange reserves by central banks, a trend that accelerated among emerging market economies after the Asian crisis of 1997 and 1998. Countries that had run out of reserves and had to accept IMF programmes with strict conditions concluded that a large stock of reserves was the best self-insurance against sudden capital outflows. China, other Asian economies and oil exporters built very large holdings, most of them invested in dollar assets, and some placed part in a sovereign wealth fund. Common guides to adequacy compare reserves with months of imports, short-term external debt or a broader IMF metric. Accumulation has costs: reserves usually earn less than the country pays on its own borrowing, sterilising the inflows can be expensive, and the combined demand for safe dollar assets contributed to low US interest rates and to global imbalances. These costs are one reason for interest in pooled and multilateral alternatives.
Multiple Reserve Currency System
A multiple reserve currency system is an international monetary system in which several currencies share the reserve role, rather than one currency dominating. The dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, the pound sterling and, increasingly, the Chinese yuan are all held as reserves, but the dollar still accounts for the largest share by a wide margin. Supporters argue that a more balanced system would spread both the privileges and the burdens of issuing reserves, reduce dependence on US policy and ease the Triffin dilemma by allowing global demand for safe assets to be met by several issuers. Critics warn that competition among reserve currencies could make the system less stable, because central banks might shift large holdings between currencies, causing sharp exchange rate swings. A shift would also require deep, open and liquid markets in other currencies, which is why the euro and the yuan have so far gained ground only slowly.
Bancor
The bancor was the supranational currency that John Maynard Keynes proposed for an International Clearing Union in the British plan for the post-war monetary system, prepared in the early 1940s. Countries would settle their trade balances in bancor through accounts at the union, and both persistent debtors and persistent creditors would face charges and pressure to adjust, so the burden would not fall only on deficit countries. The amount of bancor would expand with world trade rather than depend on any one country's currency or on gold. At the 1944 Bretton Woods conference the American plan, prepared by Harry Dexter White, prevailed, creating the International Monetary Fund and a system centred on the dollar and gold. The bancor is regularly revived in reform debates, for example by Zhou Xiaochuan, then governor of the People's Bank of China, in 2009, as a model for a reserve asset not tied to a national currency, an idea partly reflected in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR).
Substitution Account
A substitution account, also called a reserve substitution account, is a proposed facility at the IMF that would let central banks exchange unwanted dollar reserves for claims denominated in SDRs. The idea was discussed in the 1970s and came closest to adoption in 1979 and 1980, when the dollar was falling and holders feared further losses. By depositing dollars in the account, central banks could reduce their dollar exposure without selling dollars in the market, which would have pushed the currency down further. Negotiations broke down in 1980 mainly over who would bear the exchange rate risk if the dollar kept falling against the SDR, since the account would hold dollar assets but owe SDR liabilities, and because a recovering dollar reduced the sense of urgency. After 2008 economists revived the proposal as a way to diversify reserves away from the dollar, for example by shifting holdings into SDR-denominated claims, but it has not been adopted.
Freely Usable Currency
A freely usable currency is a member's currency that the IMF determines is widely used to make payments for international transactions and widely traded in the principal exchange markets. The concept comes from the IMF's Articles of Agreement. It matters for IMF operations because when the Fund lends, members can be asked to provide freely usable currencies, and borrowers must be able to convert what they receive into the currencies they need. The currencies that make up the SDR basket are the freely usable currencies: the US dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, the Japanese yen and the pound sterling. The renminbi was added when it joined the SDR basket in October 2016. Being freely usable is a technical test for IMF purposes, not a statement that a currency is fully convertible; China, for example, kept some capital controls after the decision. The designation is reviewed with the SDR valuation.
Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN)
The global financial safety net (GFSN) is the set of resources that countries can draw on in a balance of payments or financial crisis. It has four main layers. The first is each country's own foreign exchange reserves. The second is bilateral arrangements, especially central bank swap lines, such as the standing dollar lines between the Federal Reserve and five other major central banks. The third is regional financing arrangements, including the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in the euro area and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation among ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea. The fourth, at the centre, is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose quota and borrowed resources fund its lending facilities. The net has grown much larger since 2008, but access is uneven: swap lines reach only a few countries, and many emerging and low-income economies rely mainly on their own reserves and the IMF.
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