Global imbalances are large and persistent current account surpluses in some major economies matched by large deficits in others. The term came into wide use in the early 2000s, when the United States ran deficits of several per cent of its output while China, Japan, Germany and oil-exporting countries ran large surpluses. Because one country's deficit must be financed by others' surpluses, the pattern implies a steady flow of capital from surplus to deficit economies.
Imbalances are not in themselves a problem: a country that saves more than it invests can lend abroad, and a fast-growing country may sensibly borrow. Concern arises when the positions are large, long-lasting and driven by policy distortions, so that they build up debts that may unwind abruptly. The International Monetary Fund and the G20 have treated them as a central question for the international monetary system.
The current account identity
The current account records a country's trade in goods and services plus net income and transfers from abroad. National accounting links it to saving and investment:
Here is the current account balance, is national saving by households, firms and government combined, and is domestic investment. If a country saves 22 per cent of its GDP and invests 25 per cent, its current account deficit is 25 minus 22, or 3 per cent of GDP, financed by net borrowing from or sales of assets to the rest of the world. Across the world as a whole, surpluses and deficits should add to zero, although measurement errors leave a statistical discrepancy. The identity shows that an imbalance reflects saving and investment choices, not only exchange rates or trade policy.
Causes
Several explanations have been offered, and most economists see a mix of them:
- A global saving glut. In a 2005 speech, Ben Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve governor, argued that high saving in emerging Asia and oil exporters, rather than low US saving alone, drove the US deficit.
- Reserve accumulation. After the Asian Financial Crisis, many emerging economies built up foreign exchange reserves as insurance, often by holding their currencies down, which raised surpluses. This is linked to debates on currency manipulation.
- Oil and commodity prices. High oil prices produced large surpluses in exporting countries, part of which was invested through sovereign wealth funds.
- Low US saving and the dollar's role. Government deficits, a housing boom and the dollar's status as the main reserve currency made it easy for the United States to borrow.
- Demographics and structural policy. Ageing populations, weak social safety nets and wage restraint can raise saving, as seen in debates about Germany and the euro area after the euro's launch.
Imbalances and the 2008 crisis
Before 2007 many warned that a sudden stop in capital inflows could cause a sharp fall in the dollar. The crisis that came took a different form. Inflows from surplus countries helped hold down long-term US interest rates and may have fed the housing and credit boom behind the global financial crisis. Later research, including work at the Bank for International Settlements, stressed that gross flows, especially European banks borrowing dollars to buy US mortgage securities, mattered more than net current account positions. Imbalances within the euro area, where deficit countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal had borrowed heavily from surplus members, were central to the later euro area debt crisis.
Policy debate
Imbalances narrowed after 2008 as US household saving rose and China's surplus fell as a share of its output, but they did not disappear. In 2009 the G20 launched a framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth, with a mutual assessment process in which members review each other's policies. The IMF's annual External Sector Report assesses whether each large economy's current account and exchange rate are in line with fundamentals, flagging "excess" imbalances rather than all of them, as part of its surveillance.
The debate echoes an older one. At Bretton Woods, John Maynard Keynes proposed that surplus countries share the burden of adjustment, but the system that emerged placed most of it on deficit countries, which run out of reserves while surplus countries face no such limit. Proposals to change this asymmetry, including reform of the reserve system, are covered in reserve currency debates and reform proposals. Large deficits are also tied to trade deficit politics, though economists generally see tariffs as a weak tool for changing the saving and investment balance that the identity describes.
External links
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