Regulation SCI (Systems Compliance and Integrity) is a set of rules adopted by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in November 2014 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It requires the entities that form the core of the US securities markets, known as SCI entities, to have policies and procedures ensuring that their technology systems have adequate capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability and security. It also requires them to take corrective action when problems occur, to notify the SEC, and to inform members and participants.
The regulation replaced a voluntary programme, the SEC's Automation Review Policy, under which exchanges had reported on their systems since the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was adopted after a series of high-profile technology failures, including the 2010 flash crash, trading problems during a major initial public offering in 2012 and a 2013 outage of a consolidated market data feed. Most entities had to comply from November 2015.
Who is covered
Regulation SCI applies to a defined list of entity types rather than to every market participant:
- Registered national securities exchanges and registered securities associations, in practice including FINRA.
- Registered clearing agencies and certain exempt clearing agencies; see clearing agency.
- The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.
- Plan processors that run the consolidated market data feeds.
- Alternative trading systems whose trading volume in certain stocks exceeds set thresholds.
Broker-dealers other than those operating such systems are generally outside the rule, as are most investment advisers. Many covered entities are also self-regulatory organizations, for which market technology is a central function. In 2023 the SEC proposed amendments that would expand the list of SCI entities and strengthen requirements on cybersecurity and third-party providers; the SEC withdrew that proposal in June 2025, so the scope described here is the rule as originally adopted.
Key requirements
An SCI entity must maintain written policies and procedures for its SCI systems, which are the systems that directly support trading, clearing and settlement, order routing, market data, regulation or surveillance. The policies must cover capacity planning, stress testing, development and testing methods, monitoring for intrusions, and business continuity and disaster recovery plans. Those plans must provide for backup and recovery capabilities that are geographically diverse and designed to resume critical systems within two hours after a wide-scale disruption, with other systems resumed by the next business day.
Entities must also designate members or participants to take part in scheduled business continuity testing of these plans at least once a year, which links individual firms' arrangements to the market's overall ability to recover. In addition, each SCI entity must carry out an annual SCI review, an objective assessment of its compliance that includes reviews of internal controls and periodic penetration testing, and submit a report on it to senior management and to the SEC.
SCI events and reporting
The rule defines three kinds of SCI events: systems disruptions, systems compliance issues (where a system operates in a way that does not comply with the securities laws or the entity's own rules), and systems intrusions, meaning unauthorised entry into SCI systems. When responsible staff become aware of an SCI event, the entity must begin corrective action promptly. It must notify the SEC immediately for most events, followed by a written notification within set time frames and updates until the event is resolved, using Form SCI.
Information about events that affect members or participants must generally be disseminated to them, though details of intrusions can be delayed where disclosure would compromise security. De minimis events with no significant impact are logged and summarised in periodic reports instead. The SEC uses this information in its inspections and to identify weaknesses that recur across several entities. Entities also report material systems changes to the SEC on a regular basis.
Significance and criticism
Regulation SCI made technology resilience a formal regulatory obligation for US market infrastructure, enforceable by the SEC, and it gave the Commission a detailed view of outages and near misses across the markets. It is often compared with operational resilience regimes in other jurisdictions, such as those of the UK and the European Union, which focus more broadly on keeping important business services running through severe but plausible disruption, and its event categories overlap with modern cybersecurity practice. Critics from the industry argued during the rulemaking that the requirements were costly and prescriptive, especially for smaller trading venues, while others have argued that the rule does not reach important firms, such as large broker-dealers, whose system failures can also disrupt markets.
External links
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