Operational resilience is the ability of a firm, or of the financial system as a whole, to prevent, adapt to, respond to, recover from and learn from operational disruptions, so that it keeps delivering important services through severe but plausible events. The disruptions in view include cyber attacks, technology failures, the loss of a key supplier, pandemics, physical damage to sites and failures at a shared market infrastructure.
The idea grew out of operational risk management and business continuity planning but shifts the emphasis. Instead of asking mainly how likely an individual failure is, it assumes that disruptions will happen and asks whether customers and markets can still be served when they do. Since 2021 it has been written into rules and principles by the UK's Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the EU's DORA and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Core concepts
Most frameworks share a small set of building blocks:
- Important business services. These are services provided to external users whose disruption could cause intolerable harm to customers or threaten market integrity or stability; firms identify each important business service from the outside in, starting with what users rely on.
- Impact tolerances. Each service has a maximum tolerable level of disruption, usually expressed as a time limit and sometimes combined with volumes or customer numbers; an impact tolerance is set by harm to users, not by internal system recovery targets.
- Mapping. Firms identify the people, processes, technology, facilities, data and third parties behind each service in order to find single points of failure and concentration on one supplier.
- Testing. Firms run scenario testing against severe but plausible events to see whether they can stay within tolerance, then fix the weaknesses the tests reveal.
- Governance. The board owns the framework, approves a regular self-assessment and reviews lessons learned from real incidents.
The UK regime
The PRA and FCA published their final policy in March 2021. The rules took effect on 31 March 2022, by which date firms had to identify their important business services, set impact tolerances and begin mapping and testing. A transition period ran to 31 March 2025, by which date firms had to be able to remain within their impact tolerances in severe but plausible scenarios. The FCA's rules sit in SYSC 15A of its Handbook, and the PRA's in the Operational Resilience Part of its Rulebook; the Bank of England applies a parallel approach to financial market infrastructures. Separately, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 gave the regulators powers over critical third parties designated by HM Treasury, such as large cloud providers, part of the wider trend towards critical third-party oversight.
The EU approach under DORA
In the EU, DORA has applied since 17 January 2025 to banks, insurers, investment firms, payment and e-money institutions, crypto-asset service providers and many other financial entities. It is narrower in subject than the UK regime, focusing on information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risk, but it is more prescriptive. Firms must keep an ICT risk management framework, classify and report major ICT incidents, run a resilience testing programme that includes threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) for selected firms, and manage ICT third-party risk through contract terms, registers of arrangements and exit plans. Where the UK speaks of important business services, DORA refers to critical or important functions, and the most significant technology suppliers can be designated for direct oversight by the European supervisory authorities.
International standards
The Basel Committee's Principles for Operational Resilience, published in March 2021 together with revised principles for the sound management of operational risk, give banks a common approach covering governance, operational risk management, business continuity planning and testing, mapping of interconnections and interdependencies, third-party dependency management, incident management and resilient ICT, including cyber security. For payment systems, central counterparties and securities settlement systems, international principles for market infrastructures and related cyber guidance cover FMI operational resilience. Supervisors in Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and elsewhere have issued their own rules or guidance built on similar ideas, so multinational groups often run one framework mapped to several regimes.
Operational resilience in digital assets
Stablecoin issuers, crypto exchanges and custodians face the same questions with additional dependencies: blockchain networks, validators, oracles, bridges, wallet infrastructure and key management. Regulators increasingly apply resilience rules to them directly. EU crypto-asset service providers and token issuers fall under DORA, and licensing regimes for stablecoin issuers in several jurisdictions expect evidence of business continuity, cyber security and the ability to keep honouring redemptions during a disruption. A business continuity plan remains part of the toolkit, but resilience frameworks judge it by whether services actually stay within tolerance rather than by whether a plan exists on paper.
External links
Ref 1050000655