Trade-based money laundering techniques are the methods by which criminals use trade transactions to disguise the origin of funds and move value between countries. Trade-Based Money Laundering works because international trade is high in volume, involves many parties and documents, and gives plausible reasons for payments to cross borders. The techniques described here have been discussed in studies by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) and the Egmont Group, and in customs and banking guidance.
Most methods work by making the paperwork misstate price, quantity, quality or the existence of the goods, so that value passes from one party to another in a way that looks like ordinary trade. The best known pair, Over-Invoicing and Under-Invoicing, is covered on its own page. The sections below describe the remaining techniques, the related financing offence, and the indicators that banks, customs agencies and trade finance staff look for; see Trade Finance Fraud and Red Flag (AML).
Misdescription of Goods
Misdescription means that the goods declared on the commercial documents differ from what was actually shipped, in type, quality or quantity. A cheap product may be described as a premium one, or a different item altogether may be named, so that the invoiced value no longer matches reality and a payment can be justified that is larger or smaller than the true worth.
The paperwork involved includes the Commercial Invoice, the Bill of Lading and the Customs Declaration. Red flags are descriptions that are vague or inconsistent between documents, goods whose declared price is far from market levels, and shipments that do not suit the buyer's or seller's known business. Customs authorities check descriptions against inspection and tariff data, while banks compare documents presented under a letter of credit. A mismatch alone proves nothing, as clerical errors are common, but repeated discrepancies call for scrutiny.
Multiple Invoicing
Multiple invoicing is the issuing of more than one invoice for the same shipment or payment. Each invoice can then be used to explain a separate transfer, so one real trade supports several payments, which may be routed through different banks or accounts and so appear unconnected.
The same device appears in fraud: where one shipment is used to obtain finance from several lenders, it is known as Double Financing. In laundering, the extra invoices create an apparent reason to remit sums larger than the trade value. Red flags include repeated invoices for the same goods and dates, payment requests from different banks for one contract, and amounts that exceed the goods' recorded value. Controls are invoice matching, duplicate checks across a bank's trade portfolio, and reconciliation of payments to shipping records.
Over-Shipment and Under-Shipment
Over-shipment and under-shipment occur when the quantity actually sent is greater or smaller than the quantity invoiced. If a seller sends more goods than invoiced, the buyer receives value in excess of what was paid for; if less, the payment exceeds the goods received. In either case value is moved to one party without a record in the payments.
The technique is related to price manipulation, but the falsification concerns volume and not unit price. Detection depends on comparing the quantities in invoices, bills of lading, packing lists and customs records with the receiving side's records, and on mirror trade data in which one country's reported exports are compared with the partner's reported imports. Persistent gaps for a particular commodity or route are a recognised indicator, and ports and Free Trade Zone areas can make checking harder.
Phantom Shipment
A phantom shipment is a trade that exists only on paper: invoices, transport documents and sometimes insurance certificates are produced for goods that were never shipped. The purpose is to justify payments between related parties, or to obtain finance on the basis of non-existent goods.
Because no goods move, the documents are the only evidence. Red flags include transport routes that make no commercial sense, vessels or containers that cannot be traced, missing or inconsistent tracking data, businesses with no premises or staff, and a buyer and seller with common ownership. Banks examine documents, but may also use shipping data, port records and a Freight Forwarder's confirmation. The scheme often involves a Shell Company. Evidence such as Proof of Delivery helps confirm that goods actually arrived.
Services-Based Money Laundering (SBML)
Services-based money laundering uses invoices for intangible services, such as consulting, software, marketing, management fees or royalties, to justify the movement of funds. Services leave no physical trail, no customs declaration and no shipping record, so there is nothing to inspect, and prices are subjective and hard to benchmark.
The FATF has drawn attention to the risk that services-based laundering is harder to detect than goods-based trade because the checks available to customs authorities do not apply. Red flags include payments for services that the payer has no evident need for, vague contract terms, fees unrelated to the provider's size, payments to offshore entities, and invoices with no deliverables. Controls rest on due diligence on the parties and the commercial rationale, which is the work of Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and ongoing monitoring.
Trade-Based Terrorist Financing
Trade-based terrorist financing is the use of trade transactions to move value to terrorist groups. It uses the same methods as laundering, such as false invoicing or manipulated shipments, but the aim differs: in laundering the funds have a criminal source and are being disguised, whereas in terrorist financing the source may be legitimate and the destination is the concern. See Terrorist Financing (TF).
Because amounts can be small, the activity is difficult to separate from legitimate commerce. Indicators include trade with conflict-affected regions, the involvement of designated persons, and unusual routing through jurisdictions with weak controls. Financial institutions apply sanctions screening and the FATF Recommendations on terrorist financing, and share information with authorities through suspicious activity reporting. The related informal channels are shown in Black Market Peso Exchange and Hawala.
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