A systemically important financial market infrastructure is a payment system, central securities depository, securities settlement system, central counterparty or trade repository whose failure or disruption could spread problems across the financial system and the wider economy. Such infrastructures handle very large values, connect most major banks and dealers, and often have no ready substitute. Authorities therefore subject them to stricter standards and closer supervision than other firms.
The concept builds on the broader idea of a financial market infrastructure (FMI). The international standard for FMIs is the PFMI, published in April 2012 by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), then known as the CPSS, and IOSCO. The PFMI are intended to apply to all systemically important payment systems and to all CSDs, securities settlement systems, CCPs and trade repositories, with national authorities deciding which payment systems are systemically important.
What makes an FMI systemically important
Authorities weigh several factors when judging whether an FMI is systemically important:
- Size. The number and value of transactions it processes, absolutely and relative to the market.
- Substitutability. Whether participants could quickly move their activity elsewhere if it stopped working.
- Interconnectedness. Its links with other FMIs and with large financial institutions, which could transmit stress, as discussed under FMI interdependency.
- Role in monetary policy and liquidity. Whether the central bank uses it to implement policy or provide liquidity.
- Market concentration. Whether it serves as the only infrastructure for an asset class or currency.
Payment systems are the clearest example. A large-value system such as CHIPS or a central bank's real-time gross settlement system is usually classed as a systemically important payment system. Most CSDs and CCPs are treated as systemically important by default because of their central role in their markets.
Designation in the United States
In the United States, Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010, allows the Financial Stability Oversight Council to designate a financial market utility (FMU) as systemically important. In July 2012 the Council designated eight FMUs: The Clearing House Payments Company, which operates CHIPS; CLS Bank International; the Chicago Mercantile Exchange; The Depository Trust Company; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; ICE Clear Credit; National Securities Clearing Corporation; and The Options Clearing Corporation.
Designated FMUs are supervised by the Federal Reserve, the SEC or the CFTC, depending on their type, and must meet risk management standards based on the PFMI. The Federal Reserve applies its standards through Regulation HH for the FMUs it supervises. Title VIII also allows designated FMUs to hold accounts at Federal Reserve Banks and, in unusual and exigent circumstances, to receive discount and borrowing privileges.
Designation in the EU and UK
In the euro area, the European Central Bank's regulation on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems identifies the payment systems subject to its standards, which are based on the PFMI. CCPs are authorised and supervised under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation, and CSDs under the Central Securities Depositories Regulation; both regimes treat these infrastructures as critical by nature. Third-country CCPs that are systemically important for the EU can be classed as Tier 2 and placed under direct ESMA supervision.
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England supervises payment systems recognised by HM Treasury, along with CCPs and CSDs, and applies standards consistent with the PFMI.
Additional requirements
Systemic importance brings heavier obligations. Under the PFMI, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain financial resources sufficient to cover the default of the two participants creating the largest exposures, often called cover 2. All FMIs within scope must have comprehensive recovery plans, covered under FMI recovery plan, and authorities must be able to resolve a failing infrastructure while preserving its critical services, as described under FMI resolution planning. The Financial Stability Board's Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes include an annex on FMIs.
Debate and criticism
Post-crisis reforms deliberately moved more activity into infrastructures, notably through mandatory clearing of standardised over-the-counter derivatives. This reduced bilateral exposures but concentrated systemic risk in a small number of CCPs and depositories, leading some observers to describe them as too important to fail. The debate has focused on whether CCPs hold enough of their own capital, how losses should be shared in recovery, how cross-border supervision should work and how to manage cyber and operational risks that could stop a critical service.