FMI interdependency is the set of connections between a financial market infrastructure (FMI) and other entities on which it relies or which rely on it. Payment systems, central securities depositories, central counterparties and trade repositories are linked to each other directly, share many of the same participants and settlement banks, and depend on common providers of messaging, technology and liquidity. These connections make settlement more efficient, but they also create channels through which an operational failure, a participant default or a liquidity shortage in one place can travel quickly to others.
The subject was set out by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, now the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), in a 2008 report on the interdependencies of payment and settlement systems. Its analysis was carried into the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) of 2012, which expect each FMI to identify and manage the risks it bears from, and poses to, other entities.
Types of interdependency
The 2008 report grouped interdependencies into three kinds:
- System-based. Direct operational or financial links between infrastructures, such as a securities settlement system that settles the cash leg of delivery versus payment (DvP) transactions in a central bank's real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, or a formal FMI link arrangement between two depositories or two CCPs.
- Institution-based. Connections that arise because the same financial institution participates in several infrastructures or provides them with services, for example as a settlement bank, custodian, liquidity provider or investment counterparty.
- Environmental. Broader common factors, such as reliance on the same messaging network, the same data centres or the same markets for liquidating collateral.
Foreign exchange settlement illustrates all three. Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) depends on the RTGS systems of the central banks whose currencies it settles, its members are often members of the same CCPs and depositories, and all of them rely heavily on SWIFT messaging.
How disruption spreads
Interdependencies change the shape of risk rather than simply adding to it. Tight links reduce some risks: DvP settlement in central bank money removes principal risk, and links between depositories reduce the number of intermediaries. At the same time they increase the speed and reach of problems. A delay in an RTGS system can hold up settlement in every system that depends on it. The default of a large bank that is a member of several CCPs triggers default procedures in all of them at once, and the CCPs may then compete to sell similar collateral in the same markets. A failure at a shared technology provider can affect many infrastructures simultaneously.
Institution-based links are often the hardest to see, because each FMI knows only its own relationship with a bank. A single bank may act as settlement bank, custodian and liquidity provider to one CCP while being one of its largest clearing members, so that its failure would remove resources just when they were needed. That is a form of concentration risk that can also feed systemic risk.
Management under the PFMI
The PFMI address interdependency in several places. Principle 3, on the framework for comprehensive management of risks, expects an FMI to review regularly the material risks arising from its dependence on participants, other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers and service providers, and to develop tools to manage them. Principle 20 sets standards for links with other FMIs. Annex F sets oversight expectations for critical service providers, which the related entry on FMI service-level dependency discusses. Principles on credit and liquidity risk require stress tests that consider the default of a participant together with its affiliates, including affiliates that provide services to the FMI.
In practice, management starts with mapping: listing every entity whose failure would affect the FMI's critical services and identifying where several roles are concentrated in one group. FMIs then diversify settlement banks and liquidity providers where they can, settle in central bank money, include wrong-way combinations in stress tests and coordinate business continuity tests with linked systems. Authorities add a system-wide view, because cooperative oversight arrangements allow them to share information across infrastructures that no single FMI can see.
Wider significance
Interdependency is one reason the PFMI treat recovery and resolution planning as a system-wide concern. A plan that relies on a liquidity line from a bank that is also a major participant may fail in the scenario it is designed for. Authorities have therefore paid particular attention to the links among the largest CCPs and their common clearing members, and to the reliance of many infrastructures on a small number of technology and cloud providers. The same analysis underlies operational resilience mapping, which traces the end-to-end chain behind each critical service.