Prepayment risk is the risk that borrowers repay principal at a different pace from the one a lender or investor expected, so that cash arrives sooner or later than planned. It is most closely associated with a mortgage-backed security, whose payments come from homeowners who are generally free to repay at any time, but it affects any loan or bond that can be retired early.
The risk exists because the borrower holds an option. A homeowner with a fixed-rate mortgage can refinance when rates fall and stay put when they rise, and will tend to do whichever is worse for the lender. It is a different risk from default: the investor is repaid in full, but at an unwelcome time.
Contraction and extension
Prepayment risk has two sides, both tied to interest rates.
- Contraction risk. When rates fall, refinancing accelerates and principal is returned early. The investor must reinvest it at the new, lower rates, and loses the above-market interest the old loans were paying.
- Extension risk. When rates rise, prepayments slow. The investor's money stays locked in loans paying below-market interest for longer than expected, and the security's life and price sensitivity increase just as prices are falling.
The combined effect is known as negative convexity. An ordinary bond gains more when rates fall than it loses when they rise by the same amount. A mortgage security does the reverse: its price gain is capped because it shortens in a rally, and its loss is magnified because it lengthens in a sell-off. Its duration therefore moves against the holder in both directions.
Worked example
Suppose an investor pays 104 for a mortgage security with a face amount of 100 and a 6 percent coupon, expecting it to remain outstanding for several years. If rates drop and the entire balance is repaid at par after one year, the investor has received 6 in interest and 100 in principal for an outlay of 104. The return for the year is percent, far below the 6 percent coupon, because the 4-point premium was lost in a single year.
Had the security lasted five years, the same premium would have been spread over five years of interest, a cost of roughly 0.8 points a year, leaving a yield of about 5 percent. The example shows why securities priced above par suffer most from fast prepayment. Securities bought below par are affected in the opposite way: early repayment at par brings the discount forward and raises the yield, and slow repayment delays it.
Who bears the risk
Holders of pass-through mortgage securities bear the risk directly, since every prepayment in the pool is passed to them in proportion to their holding. Banks that keep fixed-rate mortgages on their balance sheets face it as part of their interest rate risk. Owners of mortgage servicing rights lose a stream of fees when loans are paid off.
The same exposure arises with a callable bond, which an issuer will redeem when it can borrow more cheaply. The difference is that a company exercises its option efficiently, while homeowners do so unevenly, which is why prepayments must be estimated statistically through an assumed prepayment rate and benchmarks such as the PSA prepayment model.
How the risk is managed and priced
Investors are paid for bearing prepayment risk through a higher yield than that on government bonds of similar maturity. Analysts estimate how much of that extra yield is compensation for the borrower's option by simulating many interest-rate paths and the prepayments expected on each.
Structuring redistributes the risk. A collateralized mortgage obligation divides the cash flows of a mortgage pool into classes with different priorities. A planned amortization class receives a fixed schedule of principal as long as prepayments stay within a set band, and companion classes absorb the variation. Stripped securities concentrate the risk: interest-only securities lose value when prepayments speed up, and principal-only securities gain.
Lenders can limit the risk at source with a prepayment penalty or a lock-out period, devices that are common in commercial mortgages and restricted by consumer law in many residential markets. Portfolio managers hedge what remains with interest rate swaps, Treasury futures and options on swaps, adjusting the hedge as rates move because the duration of the mortgage holding keeps changing.
Limitations of prepayment forecasts
Prepayment models are fitted to past borrower behaviour, and that behaviour depends on lending standards, house prices, refinancing costs and government policy. Changes in any of these have caused actual speeds to depart widely from forecasts, so measures of prepayment risk are estimates and not fixed properties of a security.