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FMI Operational Resilience

Compliance Risk and ControlsUpdated 16 Nov 2026

FMI operational resilience is the capacity of a financial market infrastructure (FMI) to prevent, withstand, adapt to and recover from operational disruptions while continuing to provide its critical services. Disruptions include technology failures, cyber attacks, failures at third-party providers, loss of premises and staff, and errors in processing. Because payment systems, central securities depositories and central counterparties sit at the centre of markets, an outage of even a few hours can prevent settlement across the financial system.

The international standard is Principle 17 of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI), which deals with operational risk, supplemented by guidance on cyber resilience from the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and IOSCO. Regional and national rules, such as the EU's Digital Operational Resilience Act and the UK authorities' policy on impact tolerances, build on the same ideas.

01

Principle 17 and the two-hour objective

Principle 17 expects an FMI to identify plausible internal and external sources of operational risk and to mitigate them through appropriate systems, policies, procedures and controls. Its main expectations are:

  • Governance. A board-approved operational risk framework with clear objectives for reliability and security.
  • Capacity. Systems that are scalable and can handle stress volumes.
  • Security. Comprehensive physical and information security policies.
  • Business continuity. A plan for events that pose a significant risk of disrupting operations, including widespread or major disruption, with a secondary site.
  • Interdependencies. Identification of risks posed by key participants, other FMIs and service and utility providers.

The best-known expectation is quantitative. The business continuity plan should be designed so that critical IT systems can resume operations within two hours of a disruptive event, and so that the FMI can complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in extreme circumstances. The two hours act as a recovery time objective for critical services, and the plan must be tested regularly.

02

Cyber resilience

Cyber attacks challenge the traditional approach to continuity. Replicating data to a secondary site protects against a fire or a power failure, but it may also replicate corrupted or malicious data. CPMI and IOSCO therefore published guidance on cyber resilience for FMIs in June 2016. It organises cyber risk management under five headings, governance, identification, protection, detection, and response and recovery, supported by testing, situational awareness, and learning and evolving.

The guidance keeps the two-hour objective as a target for resuming critical operations after a cyber event, but recognises that the FMI must also protect the integrity of its data. Infrastructures are expected to plan for scenarios in which the objective cannot be met safely, including the ability to rebuild positions from participants' records and to reconcile before resuming. Cybersecurity risk testing has moved towards threat-led penetration testing, such as the TIBER-EU framework published by the European Central Bank (ECB).

03

Third parties and mapping

FMIs rely on providers of messaging, network, data centre and cloud services. Annex F of the PFMI sets expectations for critical service providers in areas such as risk identification, information security, reliability and communication with users. The FMI remains responsible for its services whatever it outsources, and records those arrangements in an outsourcing register; the dependency itself is discussed under FMI service-level dependency.

Modern frameworks start from services rather than systems. The FMI identifies its critical or important services, sets the maximum tolerable disruption for each, and maps the people, processes, technology, facilities and suppliers behind them, a practice described under operational resilience mapping. Severe but plausible scenarios are then tested against those tolerances, and weaknesses are fixed.

04

Regional requirements

In the European Union, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), which has applied since 17 January 2025, sets rules on information and communication technology risk management, incident reporting, resilience testing and third-party risk for financial entities including CCPs, CSDs and trading venues, and creates an oversight regime for critical ICT third-party providers. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England (BoE) requires the FMIs it supervises to identify important business services and set impact tolerances, and a regime for critical third-party oversight covers key service providers to the sector. US designated financial market utilities follow risk management standards issued by their supervisory agencies, which include operational risk requirements derived from the PFMI.

05

Supervisory focus

Authorities treat operational resilience as one of the main risks for FMIs, alongside credit and liquidity risk. Supervisory work concentrates on concentration in a small number of cloud and technology providers, the ability to recover from destructive cyber attacks, coordinated sector-wide exercises, and the interaction between operational incidents and recovery planning. An operational event severe enough to threaten an FMI's viability is one of the scenarios that recovery plans and wind-down plans must address.

Last updated 16 Nov 2026