Business continuity is the ability of an organisation to keep its critical operations running, or restore them quickly, when something disrupts normal working: a power cut, a fire, a flood, a pandemic, a failed system or a cyberattack. In finance it refers to the planning and controls that let banks, payment systems and exchanges keep processing payments and trades during and after such events. The planning work is known as business continuity planning (BCP), and its written result as a business continuity plan.
Business continuity is one part of managing operational risk. It overlaps with disaster recovery, which concentrates on restoring IT systems and data, and with the newer idea of operational resilience, which asks whether a firm can keep delivering its most important services within set limits whatever the cause of the disruption. For payment and settlement systems the main international expectations are set out in the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI), and supervisors in many countries add their own rules.
Impact analysis and recovery targets
A continuity programme usually starts with a business impact analysis. This ranks the firm's processes by how much harm their loss would cause and maps the people, systems, premises, data and suppliers each one depends on. Targets are then set for each critical process:
- Recovery time objective. The recovery time objective (RTO) is the longest period the process may be unavailable before it must be running again.
- Recovery point objective. The recovery point objective (RPO) is the greatest amount of data, measured as a span of time, that may be lost; an RPO of zero means that no confirmed transaction may be lost.
- Minimum service level. Some plans also state the reduced level of service that is acceptable while the firm operates in recovery mode.
The plan itself names who declares a continuity event, who does what, how staff, customers and regulators are told, and how work moves to backup sites. The international standard ISO 22301 on business continuity management systems is widely used as a reference.
Backup sites, redundancy and cyber threats
Most financial firms rely on a secondary data centre or office far enough from the primary site that one event is unlikely to affect both. Data are copied between sites, synchronously where no loss is acceptable. Building in redundancy removes any single point of failure, such as one network link, one power supply or one key supplier. Payment providers may also keep payment failover routes that switch traffic to another processor or channel automatically. The backup system at a secondary site can range from a hot standby with continuously mirrored data to warm or cold arrangements that take longer to bring into service.
Cyberattacks have changed the picture. A fire destroys one site, but malicious software or corrupted data can be copied to the backup site within seconds by the same replication that protects against physical loss. Plans therefore include isolated copies of data and the ability to rebuild systems from a known clean state. The CPMI and IOSCO addressed this in guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures in June 2016, and cybersecurity risk is now a main test scenario.
Expectations for financial market infrastructures
Payment systems, central counterparties and other financial market infrastructures face especially demanding standards, because an outage can stop money and securities moving across a whole market. Principle 17 of the PFMI, on operational risk, expects an infrastructure to have a business continuity plan for events that pose a significant risk of disrupting operations, including wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should use a secondary site and be designed so that critical IT systems can resume within two hours of a disruptive event and settlement can be completed by the end of the day, even in extreme circumstances.
The same principle asks infrastructures to identify the risks that key participants, other infrastructures and critical service providers pose to their operations, and to test continuity arrangements with them. A systemic disruption at one infrastructure can spread to others, so tests often involve several systems at once. Further detail is in the entry on FMI operational resilience.
From continuity to operational resilience
Supervisors have moved from asking whether firms have plans to asking whether they can actually keep important services going. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority require firms within scope to identify each important business service, set an impact tolerance for the maximum disruption it can bear, and show that they can stay within it in severe but plausible scenarios. In the European Union, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), which has applied since January 2025, sets common rules for ICT risk management, incident reporting, resilience testing and oversight of critical ICT third-party providers across most types of financial firm.
Continuity planning remains a core tool under these regimes, inside a wider framework that also covers dependency mapping and oversight of critical third parties.
Testing and limitations
Firms test plans through desk-based exercises in which managers talk through a scenario, technical switches to the secondary site, and full exercises run from backup arrangements. Payment systems often require participants to join industry-wide tests.
Plans written around the loss of one site can struggle with events that hit many firms at once, such as a regional power failure, the outage of a widely used cloud provider or a long pandemic. Fast recovery can also conflict with data integrity, since restarting quickly after a cyberattack risks restoring corrupted records. Supervisors therefore treat continuity as one part of operational resilience rather than a complete answer.