The FMI disclosure framework is a standard template that a financial market infrastructure (FMI) completes to explain, in public, how it observes the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI). Payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories use it to set out their legal basis, governance, risk management and operations in a common structure, so that participants, regulators and the public can compare one infrastructure with another.
The framework was published in December 2012 by the committees now known as the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), in a single document together with the assessment methodology that authorities use to judge observance of the principles. It is often read alongside a second, more numerical standard for central counterparties, the public quantitative disclosures, issued in 2015. Both rest on the idea that participants can manage the risks they bear through an FMI only if they understand those risks. The public quantitative disclosure set covers default resources, initial margin, liquidity risk, operational availability, segregation and portability, with most figures updated quarterly.
The basis in Principle 23
Principle 23 of the PFMI deals with disclosure of rules, key procedures and market data. It expects an FMI to have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures, to give participants enough information to understand the risks, fees and other material costs of taking part, and to disclose all relevant rules and key procedures publicly. It also asks the FMI to publish its fees for individual services, basic data on transaction volumes and values, and its responses to the disclosure framework, which are to be updated after material changes and at least every two years.
The disclosure obligation therefore goes beyond publishing the FMI rulebook. The rulebook says what participants must do; the disclosure explains why the infrastructure is designed as it is and what exposures participants retain.
Structure of a disclosure
A completed disclosure follows a fixed outline:
- Executive summary. A short overview of the FMI and its main risk controls.
- Summary of major changes. What has changed since the last update.
- General background. The FMI's services, participants, ownership, legal and regulatory framework and system design.
- Principle-by-principle narrative. For each applicable principle and its key considerations, a description of how the FMI meets it.
- Publicly available resources. A list of rules, policies and data the reader can consult.
The narrative section is the longest. For a central counterparty (CCP) it covers matters such as margin methodology, the size and use of the clearing fund, stress testing, default management and the treatment of client collateral. For a central securities depository (CSD) it covers the protection of issues, settlement finality and delivery versus payment (DvP). Principles that do not apply to a given type of FMI are noted as such.
Public quantitative disclosures for CCPs
Narrative disclosures describe policies but do not show how much risk a CCP is carrying at a given time. The 2015 quantitative standards fill that gap with a common set of data, published quarterly, that allows comparison across CCPs and over time. The data fields include:
- Margin. Initial margin required and held, by type of collateral and by clearing service, and the results of margin backtesting.
- Prefunded resources. The size of the default fund and of the CCP's own contribution, and the largest stress losses measured against them.
- Liquidity. Qualifying liquid resources and the largest estimated liquidity need under stress.
- Concentration and participation. The number of members and the share of margin attributable to the largest of them.
- Operations. System availability and the number of operational failures.
Analysts and clearing members use the series to compare the coverage of different clearing houses, and regulators draw on it in supervisory work. The backtesting data complement the CCP's own default management backtesting and stress results.
Use and limits
Disclosure documents are read by prospective participants in due diligence, by the auditors and risk teams of existing members, and by authorities assessing observance, including in International Monetary Fund financial sector assessments. They also help members of an FMI to manage their own liquidity risk and credit exposure to the infrastructure.
The framework has limits. Disclosures are written by the FMI itself and are not independently verified unless an authority assesses them. Narrative responses can be long and general, and quality differs between infrastructures. Quantitative data are published with a lag and in a format that requires some expertise to interpret. Work by the standard setters since the 2020 market turmoil has focused on making margin models more transparent and predictable, which builds on the same disclosure foundation.