An early amortisation trigger is an event in a revolving securitisation that ends the revolving period ahead of schedule and starts repaying the notes from pool collections. It is a standard feature of credit card securitisations and is also used in trade receivables, dealer floorplan and other deals backed by short-dated assets that are continually replaced. European documents use the British spelling; US deals usually say early amortization or rapid amortization.
The trigger protects investors when the pool, or the parties behind it, show signs of trouble. Without it, collections would keep buying new receivables from a weakening pool or a failing originator. Once it is hit, principal collections pass to noteholders instead, so the deal winds down while the assets still perform. Early amortisation triggers sit alongside other collateral performance triggers in the transaction documents of an asset-backed security.
Types of trigger
Triggers fall into two groups. Asset-based triggers measure the pool itself:
- Excess spread. The most common test in credit card deals, typically hit when the three-month average of excess spread falls below zero, meaning the pool's yield no longer covers note interest, servicing fees and charge-offs.
- Losses and arrears. Charge-offs or delinquency above set levels, often measured as rolling averages to smooth out a single bad month.
- Seller's interest and pool size. The originator's own share of the pool falls below a required minimum, or the pool is too small to support the notes, and the originator fails to add enough receivables to restore it.
Party-based triggers concern the originator and servicer: insolvency of the seller, a servicer default or failure to transfer collections on time, uncured breaches of representations, and in some deals tax or legal events that would affect the issuer. Some triggers apply automatically, while others require a decision by the trustee or a vote by a set share of investors.
What happens after a trigger
Once a trigger occurs, the revolving period ends and the deal enters early amortisation. Principal collections that would have bought new receivables are paid to noteholders on each payment date, in the order set by the securitisation waterfall. Because credit card balances are repaid quickly, often a large share each month, investors can be repaid within months, much faster than planned. In master trusts, which issue many series from one shared pool, a pool-wide trigger can affect every series at once, while a series-level trigger affects only the series concerned.
Early amortisation overrides the normal end of the deal. In a controlled amortisation, the notes are repaid in fixed instalments after the scheduled end of the revolving period. In an accumulation period, principal builds up in a trust account to make a single bullet repayment on the expected maturity date. Either path is replaced by immediate pass-through of principal once an early amortisation trigger is hit.
Effects on investors and originators
For investors, early amortisation shortens the weighted average life of the notes and returns cash when the outlook worsens. It limits exposure to a weakening pool but creates reinvestment risk, since cash comes back early, often when market spreads are wide and prices are volatile. Senior investors generally welcome the protection; investors who bought the notes for a predictable bullet maturity may find their holdings repaid in irregular amounts.
For the originator, the effect can be severe. It must fund new card balances or receivables on its own balance sheet just when market funding is hardest to obtain, which can turn a credit problem into a liquidity problem. A bank that relies heavily on securitisation for funding can find that early amortisation drains cash at the worst moment. Supervisors therefore look at revolving securitisations with early amortisation features as a possible source of funding strain, and banks include the risk in their liquidity stress testing.
Sponsor support in practice
Because the consequences for originators are so serious, some sponsors have acted to keep their trusts away from excess spread triggers in stressed periods, for example by adding higher-yielding receivables or by treating part of the principal collections as yield. Several US credit card issuers took such steps during the 2008 financial crisis. The support protected investors but showed that originators kept more of the risk than a true sale would suggest, a point that later fed into post-crisis rules on implicit support and securitisation risk retention.