Conditionality is the set of policy commitments that a member country makes to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in return for its financial support. The money is not paid out in one sum. It is released in instalments, and each instalment depends on the country carrying out the agreed policies and meeting agreed targets. The conditions have two purposes: to correct the balance of payments problem that led the country to borrow, and to protect the Fund's resources by making repayment likely.
The practice rests on the IMF's Articles of Agreement, which require that use of the Fund's general resources be temporary and backed by adequate safeguards. It grew out of the first stand-by arrangements in the 1950s and is now governed by guidelines adopted by the Executive Board in 2002 and revised several times since. The World Bank attaches its own conditions to policy-based lending, and the way the two institutions' conditions interact is known as cross-conditionality.
Types of conditions
IMF programmes combine several kinds of commitment, which differ in how strictly they bind:
- Prior actions. Steps the country must take before the Executive Board approves a programme or completes a review, such as passing a budget, adjusting an exchange rate or removing a price control.
- Quantitative performance criteria. Measurable targets, usually on the central bank's net international reserves, net domestic assets, the fiscal balance and new government borrowing. Missing one halts disbursement unless the Board grants a waiver.
- Indicative targets. Quantitative markers, often for social spending or later dates in the programme, whose miss does not by itself block a payment.
- Structural benchmarks. Reforms that are hard to measure in numbers, such as a new tax law, a bank restructuring plan or better public financial management. They are assessed as part of each review.
Some conditions apply continuously, such as a commitment not to build up new arrears on external debt or impose new restrictions on currency payments.
How a programme is agreed and monitored
A programme is negotiated between IMF staff and the authorities. The finance minister and central bank governor then sign a letter of intent addressed to the Managing Director, usually with a memorandum of economic and financial policies that lists the measures and a technical memorandum defining each target. The Executive Board approves the arrangement and the first disbursement.
Later disbursements are tied to programme reviews, typically every three or six months. At each review the Board checks performance against the criteria and benchmarks, and may approve waivers or change targets when circumstances move. This phasing gives the Fund leverage, but it also lets programmes adapt to shocks. A debt sustainability analysis underpins each arrangement, because the Fund cannot lend into a debt burden it judges unsustainable without a restructuring.
Conditionality across lending facilities
The depth of conditions depends on the instrument. Upper credit tranche arrangements, such as stand-by arrangements and the Extended Fund Facility, carry full ex post conditionality. Concessional lending to low-income countries, for example through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, links conditions to poverty-reduction strategies. Precautionary tools introduced from 2009, notably the Flexible Credit Line, rely instead on ex ante qualification: only countries with very strong fundamentals and policy records may use them, and they face few conditions afterwards. Emergency financing such as the Rapid Financing Instrument also carries little ongoing conditionality. The full range is described under IMF lending facilities, and the Fund's routine monitoring of all members, separate from lending, under IMF surveillance.
Cross-conditionality with the World Bank
In the 1980s the IMF and the World Bank Group often lent side by side to the same countries, with Bank structural adjustment loans covering trade, pricing and public enterprise reforms while the Fund focused on macroeconomic stabilisation. Debt relief under the HIPC Initiative later required countries to meet conditions set jointly by both. Formal cross-conditionality, where a loan from one depends on conditions set by the other, is avoided in principle, and each institution is expected to set conditions only in its own area of expertise.
Criticism and reform
Conditionality has been contested for decades. Critics argue that programmes have imposed excessive austerity, cut spending during recessions, and pressed a uniform market-liberal agenda associated with the Washington Consensus. The number of structural conditions grew sharply in the 1990s; programmes during the Asian Financial Crisis, notably in Indonesia, carried long lists of reforms well beyond the immediate crisis, which many observers judged counter-productive. Other critics, from the opposite direction, warn that large rescue packages with soft conditions create moral hazard for borrowers and their creditors.
The Fund has responded with several rounds of reform. The 2002 guidelines stressed national ownership and parsimony, limiting conditions to those critical to programme goals. An evaluation by the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office in 2007 found that structural conditions remained numerous and often poorly linked to results. In 2009 the Fund stopped using structural performance criteria, replacing them with benchmarks assessed at reviews, and created the precautionary facilities. Periodic reviews of programme design since then have focused on the realism of growth assumptions, the protection of social spending and the pace of fiscal adjustment.
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