A collective action clause (CAC) is a provision in a bond that allows a defined majority of bondholders to agree to changes in the bond's key financial terms, such as principal, interest, maturity or currency, and to make those changes binding on all holders, including those who voted against or did not vote. CACs are used mainly in sovereign bonds, where there is no bankruptcy court to impose a restructuring, but similar majority amendment provisions appear in many corporate bonds governed by English law.
The purpose is to make sovereign debt restructuring more orderly by reducing the power of holdout creditors, investors who refuse a restructuring offer and later sue for full payment. Without a CAC, changing payment terms typically needs the consent of every holder. CACs sit alongside other features of bond documentation, such as voting at a bondholder meeting or by written resolution, the role of a trustee or fiscal agent, and consent thresholds for other amendments.
History
Bonds governed by English law have long included majority amendment clauses, while New York-law sovereign bonds traditionally required unanimous consent to change payment terms. After the Argentine default at the end of 2001 and an IMF proposal for a statutory sovereign bankruptcy mechanism that did not win support, issuers and investors turned instead to contractual reform. Mexico included CACs in a New York-law bond in early 2003, and within a few years most new emerging-market sovereign bonds under New York law did the same.
In the euro area, governments agreed that from 1 January 2013 all new government securities with a maturity of more than one year would include a standardised model CAC, a commitment set out in the treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Greece's 2012 debt exchange showed both the strength and the limits of majority voting: Greek-law bonds were made subject to retroactive majority voting by legislation, while some foreign-law bonds with series-by-series CACs were held out.
Voting structures
CACs differ mainly in how votes are counted across different bond series:
- Series-by-series. Each bond series votes separately, typically with a threshold of 75% of outstanding principal. A holdout investor can block a series by buying a blocking stake in it.
- Two-limb aggregation. A proposal must win a supermajority of all affected series voting together and a lower majority within each series. This makes blocking harder but still allows holdouts in small series.
- Single-limb aggregation. All affected series vote as one pool, typically with a 75% threshold, so long as the same terms are offered to every series. This greatly reduces the ability to block in any individual bond.
In 2014, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) published model clauses that offer a menu including single-limb aggregated voting, together with a revised pari passu clause. The IMF supported the new terms, and they have since become standard in most new international sovereign bonds.
Holdouts and litigation
The need for stronger CACs was reinforced by litigation against Argentina in New York, where holdout creditors obtained court orders based on the pari passu clause that blocked payments to holders of restructured bonds unless the holdouts were also paid. The dispute was settled in 2016. The case showed how a small group of holders could gain leverage in a restructuring and encouraged wider use of aggregated voting.
Single-limb CACs were used in several restructurings around 2020, including those of Argentina and Ecuador. These deals also raised new questions, such as the issuer's ability to redesignate which series are included in a vote and the rule that disenfranchises bonds held or controlled by the issuer.
Limits and criticism
CACs only bind holders of bonds that contain them, so older bonds without them, loans, and debt governed by other laws are not covered. Restructurings involving official creditors and bank loans need separate processes. Some creditor groups argue that aggregated voting can let a sovereign pressure holders of particular series, and investor protection depends on uniform treatment conditions and on how voting is calculated. Others argue that CACs alone do not solve delays in restructuring, since many problems arise before any vote is called, in negotiations over the size of debt relief. Even so, CACs are now regarded as a core part of the international framework for sovereign default resolution.
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