Home / Wiki / S / Sovereign Debt Restructuring

Sovereign Debt Restructuring

Investment and Capital MarketsUpdated 17 Nov 2026

Sovereign debt restructuring is the process by which a government and its creditors change the terms of the government's debt because it cannot, or will not, pay as originally agreed. Restructurings can extend maturities, cut interest rates, reduce the principal owed, or combine all three. They usually follow or anticipate a sovereign default and are often linked to a financing programme from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Unlike a company, a state cannot be liquidated and there is no international bankruptcy court with power over it. Restructurings are therefore negotiated, with separate processes for different creditor groups: official bilateral lenders, multilateral institutions, commercial banks and bondholders. The rules of these processes have changed repeatedly as the composition of sovereign debt has shifted from bank loans to bonds and, more recently, to lending by newer official creditors such as China.

01

How restructuring works

A typical case begins when financing dries up and the government seeks IMF support. The IMF's debt sustainability analysis sets the overall amount of relief needed to make the debt sustainable, and the Fund generally lends only if creditors give assurances that restructuring will deliver that relief. The government then negotiates with each creditor group, aiming for comparable treatment so that no group is paid at the expense of others.

The economic loss to creditors is called a haircut. It can be measured as the reduction in face value or, more fully, as the fall in the net present value of payments, because maturity extensions and lower coupons can impose large losses without any cut in principal. Bond restructurings are usually carried out through a debt exchange offer, in which holders swap old bonds for new ones.

02

Official creditors: the Paris Club and the Common Framework

The Paris Club is an informal group of major creditor governments that has coordinated the rescheduling of official bilateral loans since its first meeting, on Argentina, in 1956. It works by consensus and requires debtors to seek comparable treatment from other creditors. Its terms ranged from simple debt rescheduling to deep reductions for the poorest countries under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative.

As lending by non-Paris Club countries grew, the G20 agreed in November 2020 on the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, which brings Paris Club members and other G20 creditors, including China, into one process for low-income countries. Early cases, including Zambia, Ghana and Ethiopia, took longer than expected, prompting work on faster coordination through the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable.

03

Bondholders and collective action clauses

When debt is held by thousands of bondholders, a key problem is holdouts: creditors who refuse an exchange and sue for full payment. Collective action clauses (CACs) address this by allowing a qualified majority to bind all holders to new terms. They became standard in New York-law sovereign bonds from 2003, after Mexico's issue that year, and euro-area governments have included them in new bonds since 2013. Clauses introduced in 2014 allow a single aggregated vote across all series, which makes it harder for a holdout to block a deal by buying a blocking stake in one bond.

Argentina illustrates the cost of holdouts. After defaulting in 2001 it restructured most of its bonds in 2005 and 2010, but a group of holdout funds won judgments in New York based on the bonds' pari passu clause, which blocked payments to restructured bondholders until a settlement in 2016. Argentina restructured again in 2020.

04

Notable cases

  • Germany, 1953. The London Agreement on German External Debts roughly halved pre-war and post-war obligations and tied repayment to export earnings.
  • The Brady Plan, 1989 onwards. Defaulted bank loans of many Latin American and other countries were exchanged for tradable bonds, partly collateralised by US Treasury zero-coupon bonds, which helped create the modern emerging markets bond market.
  • Greece, 2012. The private sector involvement exchanged around 200 billion euros of privately held bonds with a face-value reduction of 53.5 per cent, the largest restructuring on record at the time. Greece inserted CACs into its domestic-law bonds by legislation before the exchange.
  • Zambia. It defaulted on its Eurobonds in 2020 and became one of the first test cases of the Common Framework, reaching agreements with official and private creditors only after several years.
05

Criticism and debates

Restructurings are widely criticised as too little and too late. Governments delay to avoid the political and economic costs of default, and creditors resist losses, so relief often comes after years of recession. Researchers have argued that repeated restructurings, where the first deal proves insufficient, are common. Proposals for a statutory mechanism, notably the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in the early 2000s, were not adopted, leaving the contractual approach based on CACs. Other debates concern the treatment of domestic debt, the role of collateralised and resource-backed loans, state-contingent instruments that tie payments to growth or commodity prices, and calls to cancel odious debt incurred by former regimes.

Last updated 17 Nov 2026