The Volcker Rule is a United States regulation that bars banks and their affiliates from most short-term proprietary trading and limits their ownership and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds. It was enacted as Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which added a new section 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and is named after Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve who proposed it after the global financial crisis.
The rule rests on the view that institutions with insured deposits and access to central bank liquidity should not run speculative trading books with that support behind them. It applies to any banking entity: an insured depository institution, a company that controls one, such as a bank holding company, and their affiliates, including the US operations of foreign banks. It is narrower than the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking repealed in 1999, because banks may still underwrite securities and make markets.
Legal basis and implementation
Dodd-Frank set out the prohibitions in principle and left the detail to five agencies: the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). After a long consultation the agencies adopted a joint final rule in December 2013. Banks were given a conformance period that ended in July 2015, with extensions for some legacy fund investments until 2017.
The rule has since been eased. The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 removed most smaller banks from its scope. The agencies then adopted amendments in 2019 that tailored compliance obligations to the size of a bank's trading activity and simplified the trading definitions, and further amendments in 2020 that relaxed parts of the covered fund rules.
Proprietary trading ban and exemptions
Proprietary trading means trading as principal for a bank's own trading account, broadly positions taken to profit from short-term price movements. The ban covers securities, derivatives, commodity futures and options on them. It does not cover ordinary lending or long-term investment. The main permitted activities are:
- Underwriting. Taking positions needed to distribute new securities, within the bank's role in an underwriting.
- Market making. Holding inventory to meet the reasonably expected near-term demand of clients, the core of market making.
- Risk-mitigating hedging. Trades that reduce specific, identifiable risks of the bank's positions, a form of hedging that must be documented and monitored.
- Government obligations. Trading in US government, agency and state and municipal securities.
- Other activities. Trading on behalf of customers, by insurance company general accounts, for liquidity management, and by foreign banks outside the United States.
Covered funds
The second part of the rule restricts banks from acquiring ownership interests in, or sponsoring, covered funds, a category built around private funds that would be investment companies but for common exemptions, which takes in most hedge funds and private equity funds. A bank may still organise and offer a fund for its asset management clients, but its own investment is generally limited to 3 percent of each fund and, in aggregate, 3 percent of its Tier 1 capital. The bank may not guarantee the fund's performance, and transactions between the bank and funds it advises are restricted in a way similar to the limits on transactions with affiliates.
Compliance and criticism
Banking entities with significant trading activity must keep compliance programmes, set risk limits for each trading desk and, for the largest, report quantitative metrics to their supervisors. The central difficulty is telling permitted market making and hedging apart from prohibited speculation, since the same trade can serve either purpose. The 2012 London Whale losses at JPMorgan Chase, booked in a unit described as hedging, were cited by supporters as proof of the need for the rule while it was still being written.
Critics in the industry argued that the rule was complex and costly, and that it reduced liquidity in corporate bond markets by discouraging dealers from holding inventory, though studies of that effect reached mixed conclusions. Others argued that later revisions weakened it. Supporters see it as one of several post-crisis measures, alongside higher capital and resolution planning, aimed at reducing systemic risk and the problem of institutions considered too big to fail.
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