US arms transfer oversight and technology protection is the set of controls the United States applies to defense articles and sensitive information after a sale or transfer has been approved. Approval of a sale does not end the government's interest in the equipment. The US wants to know that it is used as agreed, is not passed to others, does not expose protected technology, and is not given to units that abuse human rights. These controls apply to sales made through Foreign Military Sales and, in different forms, to direct commercial sales.
The controls grow out of the Arms Export Control Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the ITAR and Defense Department policy. They are administered by several bodies: the State Department, the Defense Department, the intelligence community and Congress. They are part of the wider system of security cooperation and security assistance, and the terms below follow a transfer from consent and monitoring through reporting and protection of technology.
Third Party Transfer (TPT)
Third party transfer is the rule that a country receiving US-origin defense articles, services or technical data may not give, sell or otherwise transfer them to another country, or let another government or non-governmental party use them, without the prior written consent of the US government. The requirement is contained in the Arms Export Control Act and repeated as a condition in sales agreements and licenses, as with an antidiversion clause.
The holder of the article asks the US for consent, stating the item, the proposed recipient and the purpose. The State Department decides, consulting the Defense Department, and may attach conditions such as an assurance that the item will be used only for stated purposes. Consent for certain transfers, above value limits, requires notification to Congress. Transfers made without consent can lead to loss of eligibility for future deals and to other penalties.
End Use Monitoring (EUM)
End use monitoring is the US program for checking that defense articles transferred to foreign governments and companies are used for the purposes agreed and kept secure. It is required by the Arms Export Control Act and is carried out by two programs: Golden Sentry, run by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, for government-to-government sales, and Blue Lantern, run by the State Department, for commercial sales.
Monitoring combines routine checks, such as inventory reviews and visits, with checks that are triggered by a concern, for example a doubt about a buyer's reliability. Items with special security needs can be subject to enhanced monitoring. Recipients give assurances about security and use, and a violation can be reported to Congress, with consequences that include restricted future transfers. The systems of security cooperation organizations in embassies support much of the monitoring in the field.
Foreign Disclosure
Foreign disclosure is the government process of authorizing the release of classified or controlled military information to foreign governments and international organizations. Information is released only if the US benefits and the foreign recipient will protect it. A decision follows a national policy on disclosure that sets the categories of information and the countries that may receive them.
Foreign disclosure officers within the military departments and agencies examine requests and approve or deny release, and they work with those who decide whether a technology may be released to a particular foreign buyer. Disclosure is a prerequisite for many sales, because a customer cannot operate or maintain advanced equipment without some information about it. A disclosure approval may restrict what is shared, for example giving performance data but not source code.
Javits Report
The Javits Report is an annual report from the President to Congress on possible future arms sales, named after Senator Jacob Javits, who sponsored the provision. Under the Arms Export Control Act, it lists sales and licensed exports that the executive branch expects may later require formal notification, so that Congress gets advance warning of the pipeline of larger deals. It is separate from the case-by-case formal notifications that precede a particular sale.
Formal notification is required for sales above statutory value thresholds, which are lower for sales outside the closest allies, and Congress then has a fixed review period in which it may block a sale by passing a joint resolution. The review period is shorter for close allies. The President can veto a resolution, so blocking a sale requires a two-thirds vote in both houses. The report, and the practice of informal consultation with committee staff before formal notice, give Congress a voice in arms policy.
Leahy Law
The Leahy Law is the name given to US provisions that bar assistance to foreign security force units when there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The State Department version is in section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act; a separate provision, found in Defense Department law, applies to defense funds and training. They are named after Senator Patrick Leahy, who sponsored them.
Embassies vet units and individuals proposed for US training or equipment against available information. If a unit is found ineligible, assistance is withheld until the foreign government takes effective steps to bring those responsible to justice. The laws mainly govern US-funded assistance and training, not every sale paid for by a buyer's own money, though human rights are also weighed in arms transfer decisions generally. The laws are often cited in debates about aid to countries with poor human rights records.
Critical Program Information (CPI)
Critical program information is the information, technology or systems in a defense program whose loss or compromise would reduce the program's technological advantage or degrade its mission. It may include design data, software, algorithms or manufacturing processes. Identifying it is a first step in deciding what can be shared with a foreign buyer.
Defense programs prepare protection plans that list their CPI, explain why it needs protection and describe how it will be protected, including measures such as anti-tamper design, export limits and security controls. Before a sale, the government considers whether a foreign version of the equipment can be built without the most sensitive elements, a step often called technology security review. The Defense Technology Security Administration advises on these decisions. CPI differs from classified information in that it can be unclassified and still needs protection.
Communications Security (COMSEC)
Communications security is the group of measures that protect telecommunications and information from interception and exploitation by others. It includes cryptographic security, which uses cryptography to make messages unreadable; transmission security, which protects signals from interception or disruption; emission security, which limits information leaking from equipment; and physical security of the material.
Governments control COMSEC items closely in arms sales because the security of an ally's communications can affect the security of the equipment and of any joint operations. Encryption equipment is often supplied only through government channels, under an agreement on how it is to be handled, accounted for and protected, and the national authority may provide it separately from the main system. The aim is to protect both the ally's data and the encryption methods of the supplier. See also encryption.
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