The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was a US government programme set up during the global financial crisis to stabilise the banking system and the wider economy. It was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, signed into law on 3 October 2008, which authorised the Treasury Department to spend up to $700 billion. The authority was later cut to $475 billion by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.
As its name suggests, TARP was first meant to buy troubled assets, chiefly mortgage-related securities, from banks. Within weeks the Treasury changed course and used most of the money to inject capital directly into financial institutions, and later to support carmakers, the insurer AIG and homeowners. TARP was one of several rescue measures of the period, alongside emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and guarantees from the FDIC, and it remains one of the most debated bail-outs in US history.
Background
By September 2008, losses on subprime mortgages and on securities built from them, including collateralised debt obligations, had left many banks short of capital and unwilling to lend to one another. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken into conservatorship, Lehman Brothers failed, and AIG needed emergency support. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke asked Congress for broad authority to buy distressed assets. The House of Representatives rejected the first version of the bill on 29 September 2008, and stock markets fell sharply; an amended bill passed days later. Buying assets proved slow and hard to price, because no one could agree what the securities were worth, so on 14 October 2008 the Treasury announced that it would instead buy equity in banks, a step taken in parallel by the United Kingdom and several euro area governments. The roots of the crisis are covered in lending practices behind the subprime crisis.
Main components
TARP was split into several programmes with different aims.
- Capital Purchase Program (CPP). The Treasury bought preferred stock and warrants in more than 700 banks of all sizes, starting with nine large institutions in October 2008, to rebuild bank capital.
- Targeted support for large banks. Citigroup and Bank of America received additional investments, and Citigroup also received a guarantee against losses on a pool of assets.
- AIG. TARP funds were added to Federal Reserve lending to keep the insurer, a major seller of credit protection, from collapsing.
- Automotive industry. Loans and equity investments supported General Motors, Chrysler and their finance arms through restructurings, including the 2009 bankruptcies of both carmakers.
- Housing. Funds went to mortgage relief such as the Home Affordable Modification Program and to state programmes for struggling homeowners.
TARP also backed a Federal Reserve facility to revive lending against consumer and small business loans, and a programme for buying legacy securities with private investors.
Oversight and conditions
The law created a Special Inspector General for TARP (SIGTARP) and a Congressional Oversight Panel, and gave the Government Accountability Office a monitoring role. Firms receiving money faced limits on executive pay and dividends while the government remained an investor. In 2009 the largest banks went through a supervisory stress test, a forerunner of today's stress testing, and those found short of capital had to raise it privately or accept more government funds.
Repayment and outcomes
Most large banks repaid their CPP investments within a few years, often by raising new private capital, and the Treasury earned dividends and sold the warrants it held. According to the Treasury's later reports, the bank programmes returned more than was put in, the government's combined support for AIG, counting Federal Reserve lending, ended in a gain, while the automotive investments recorded a loss and the housing programmes, which were designed as grants rather than investments, were not repaid. The authority to make new commitments expired in October 2010, and later activity consisted of managing and selling the investments already made. Supporters credit TARP, with other measures, with preventing a deeper collapse of credit and employment.
Criticism
TARP was politically unpopular from the start. Critics on the left argued that it rescued bankers while doing too little for homeowners facing foreclosure; housing programmes reached fewer borrowers than first hoped. Critics on the right objected to the scale of government intervention and to the auto rescue. Many economists argued that rescuing large firms increased moral hazard and entrenched the problem of institutions seen as too big to fail, a concern that shaped later reforms for systemically important financial institutions.
External links
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