A tied aid credit is official financing on concessional terms, given by a government or its agencies to a developing country on condition that the money is spent on goods and services from the donor country. It can take the form of a grant, a low-interest loan with a long repayment period, or a package in which aid is combined with an ordinary officially supported export credit. The recipient gets cheaper finance for a project, and the donor's exporters win the contract. More broadly, any official loan given on condition that the money is spent in the lender's country is a tied loan, whether or not its terms are concessional.
Tied aid sits at the boundary between development policy and export promotion. Because it can be used to undercut competitors that offer only commercial terms, the main exporting countries regulate it through the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, the gentlemen's agreement among participating governments that also sets minimum terms for ordinary export credits. Its opposite is an untied aid loan, which can be spent on supplies from almost any country.
Forms of tied aid
The OECD rules treat several kinds of financing as tied aid when they are tied, formally or in practice, to procurement in the donor country or a limited group of countries.
- Tied grants and loans. Official development assistance (ODA) grants or concessional loans whose use is restricted to the donor's suppliers.
- Mixed credits. A mixed credit combines a grant or soft loan with an officially supported export credit in a single financing package for one project.
- Associated financing. Associated financing links aid and an export credit that are formally separate but provided for the same project or purchase.
In each case the exporter benefits from the soft element, and the buyer's overall borrowing cost falls below what the Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR) or market pricing would allow.
Why the OECD disciplines it
In the 1970s and 1980s, governments increasingly used aid budgets to subsidise exports of capital goods such as power plants, telecommunications equipment and transport systems. Competing offers of cheap tied finance distorted trade, raised the cost of aid to taxpayers and diverted aid toward projects chosen for the donor's industry rather than for development value. Participants in the Arrangement responded by tightening the rules in stages, culminating in the Helsinki disciplines agreed in 1991.
The Helsinki rules introduced a project-based test. Tied aid is generally not allowed for projects that are commercially viable, meaning projects that could generate enough cash flow to be financed on market or standard Arrangement terms. It is also excluded for richer recipient countries, defined by reference to the income threshold used by the World Bank Group for its loans. Participants must notify proposed tied aid offers and can challenge them through consultations; offers that fail the commercial viability test are expected to be withdrawn.
Concessionality requirements
To prevent thinly disguised export subsidies, the Arrangement requires tied aid to meet a minimum concessionality level, the share of the nominal value that represents a gift to the borrower. The level is calculated by discounting the loan's repayments at a reference rate and comparing the result with the face amount, a measure similar to the grant element used in aid statistics:
Here the face value is the amount of the loan and the PV of repayments is the present value of the principal and interest the borrower will pay, discounted at the Arrangement's differentiated discount rate for the currency. For example, if a loan of 100 million has repayments with a present value of 62 million, the concessionality level is , or 38 per cent. Under the Arrangement the minimum is 35 per cent for most eligible countries and 50 per cent for least developed countries, so this loan would qualify for the first group but not the second.
Role of export credit agencies
Many donors deliver tied aid through their export credit agency (ECA) or a development finance body working alongside it. The agency structures the export credit portion, provides cover or guarantees and handles the notification to other participants, while the aid ministry funds the concessional element. Some agencies also keep a matching facility to respond when a competitor offers tied aid to a buyer, so that their own exporters are not shut out. The Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) has long held such a tied aid matching capability.
Debate and trends
Development economists have criticised tying for decades. Studies by the OECD Development Assistance Committee and others have found that tying raises the cost of goods and services bought with aid, limits the recipient's choice of technology and can favour large equipment projects over more useful ones. In 2001 the DAC adopted a recommendation to untie ODA to the least developed countries, later widened to other poor countries, and the share of bilateral aid reported as untied has grown since.
Supporters argue that tied aid keeps political support for aid budgets, brings proven suppliers into difficult markets and can be justified for projects that are not commercially viable. Concerns have also grown about large official lenders that are not bound by the Arrangement, since their concessional and tied lending falls outside the OECD notification system. A related concept, trade-related concessional credit, is used when aid and trade objectives are explicitly combined.
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