Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) was a commercial bank based in Santa Clara, California, that specialised in serving technology start-ups, the venture capital firms that funded them and their founders. It failed on 10 March 2023 after a deposit run of unusual speed. With about $209 billion of assets at the end of 2022, it was then the second-largest bank failure in United States history, after Washington Mutual in 2008.
The collapse began a wider period of stress. Signature Bank in New York was closed two days later, Credit Suisse was taken over by UBS in a rescue arranged by the Swiss authorities, and First Republic Bank failed in May 2023. The episode prompted emergency action by the US authorities and a reassessment of how banks manage interest rate risk and how fast deposits can leave in the digital age.
Business model
Founded in 1983, SVB grew with the technology industry. Its depositors were concentrated in one sector and mostly held balances far above the federal insurance limit of $250,000, so the large majority of its deposits were uninsured deposits. During 2020 and 2021, as venture funding boomed and interest rates were near zero, its deposits roughly tripled. Loan demand did not keep pace, so the bank invested most of the inflow in long-dated Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities.
Interest rate risk and the bond portfolio
Much of the portfolio was classed as held-to-maturity securities, which are carried at amortised cost, so falls in their market value did not reduce reported capital. When the Federal Reserve raised rates rapidly from March 2022, the value of these long fixed-rate bonds fell sharply. By the end of 2022 the unrealised losses on the held-to-maturity book were roughly equal to the bank's equity. At the same time start-ups were burning cash as venture funding slowed, so deposits began to fall, and the bank had largely gone without hedging the duration of its assets.
The run, 8 to 10 March 2023
On 8 March 2023 SVB's parent, SVB Financial Group, announced that it had sold about $21 billion of available-for-sale securities at a loss of about $1.8 billion and planned to raise new equity. The news spread quickly among venture investors and on social media, and many advised their portfolio companies to move their money. On 9 March customers withdrew about $42 billion, roughly a quarter of deposits, in a single day, and requests for a further amount of around $100 billion were queued for the next morning. The bank could not raise cash fast enough.
On 10 March the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation closed the bank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. It was a textbook bank run, but one driven by a small, tightly connected group of depositors using online banking.
Resolution and the systemic risk exception
Under normal receivership rules, uninsured depositors would have faced losses and delays. On 12 March 2023 the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC announced that they would invoke the systemic risk exception, allowing the FDIC to protect all depositors of SVB and Signature Bank, with any loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund to be recovered by a special assessment on banks. The Federal Reserve also created the Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP), which offered loans of up to one year against Treasury and agency securities valued at par rather than market value, removing the pressure on other banks to sell bonds at a loss.
The FDIC transferred the bank to a bridge bank and later that month agreed its sale to First Citizens BancShares. SVB Financial Group filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England used its resolution powers to sell Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC for £1 on 13 March 2023, so that its depositors were protected without public money.
Lessons and aftermath
A review by the Federal Reserve's vice chair for supervision, published in April 2023, found that the bank's management had failed to control its interest rate and liquidity risks and that supervisors had been slow to act. It also pointed to the 2019 tailoring of rules for banks of SVB's size, which had eased requirements introduced after the Dodd-Frank Act. The case renewed attention to interest rate risk in the banking book, to the treatment of unrealised losses in capital, to the stability of concentrated uninsured deposits, and to whether liquidity rules assume runs that are too slow. It also reopened debate about the scope of deposit insurance and about the moral hazard of protecting all depositors.
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