A restructuring support agreement (RSA) is a contract between a financially distressed company and some of its creditors, and sometimes its shareholders or a new investor, in which the parties agree to support a particular restructuring and to take the steps needed to implement it. The signing creditors commit to vote for the deal and not to undermine it, while the company commits to pursue the agreed transaction within set deadlines. An RSA gives the company and the market confidence that a deal has enough support to succeed before it is launched.
RSAs are used in US Chapter 11 cases, especially prepackaged and prenegotiated cases, and in out-of-court and court-supervised restructurings in the United Kingdom and Europe, where the same document is usually called a lock-up agreement. They are a standard part of debt restructuring and corporate restructuring practice.
Key terms
An RSA normally attaches a term sheet describing the restructuring: for example, which debt will be written down, the terms of new instruments, any debt-for-equity swap and how new money will be raised. The main obligations are:
- Support and voting. Consenting creditors agree to vote in favour of the plan or scheme, to give any necessary consents and not to support competing proposals.
- Forbearance and standstill. Creditors agree not to accelerate their debt or enforce security during the process, even if a covenant breach or other default has occurred.
- Transfer restrictions. Creditors may sell their claims only to buyers who sign up to the agreement, which keeps the locked-up majority intact.
- Company undertakings. The company agrees to pursue the transaction, to provide information and to refrain from inconsistent actions.
Milestones and termination
RSAs set milestones, such as dates for launching a scheme of arrangement or restructuring plan, filing a Chapter 11 petition, obtaining court approval of disclosure documents and confirming the plan. If a milestone is missed, consenting creditors can usually terminate. Other termination events include a material breach, the appointment of an administrator or trustee, the loss of a court order, or the conversion of a case into liquidation.
Because directors owe duties to the company, and in distress to its creditors, RSAs commonly include a "fiduciary out", allowing the company to terminate or to consider a better proposal if its board concludes that continuing would breach those duties. Lenders negotiate the scope of this clause carefully.
Fees and incentives
To attract signatures, companies often pay a consent or lock-up fee to creditors who sign by a deadline, sometimes called an early-bird fee. Creditors may also be offered the right to provide new money on attractive terms, as in priority new money or backstop arrangements. Such benefits raise questions about equal treatment. In UK schemes and restructuring plans, courts consider whether fees available only to some creditors fracture a class or influence votes; fees that are modest, disclosed and open to all members of a class are usually accepted. In Chapter 11, courts examine whether payments to RSA parties are fair to other creditors.
Legal treatment in court processes
In the US, a debtor often signs the RSA before filing, then asks the court to approve its assumption, which makes the company's obligations enforceable as part of the case. Agreements signed after filing must respect rules restricting the solicitation of votes before a disclosure statement has been approved, and courts have generally permitted RSAs that do not amount to soliciting votes. Holders of bonds may sign through their beneficial holdings, and the bond trustee acts on their instructions.
In the UK, an RSA does not itself bind non-signatories. The company still needs a formal process, such as a scheme, a restructuring plan with cross-class cramdown or a bondholder consent solicitation, to bind the minority. The RSA's role is to secure the required majorities in advance and to show the court that the proposal has substantial support.
Advantages and criticism
RSAs reduce uncertainty, shorten court processes and lower costs, which can preserve value for all stakeholders. Critics argue that they let a small group of large creditors fix the terms before others are consulted, that fees and new-money rights can transfer value away from non-signing creditors, and that tight milestones can limit a court's scrutiny. These concerns are usually addressed through disclosure, open participation and court review of class composition.