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Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP)

Economics Markets and Financial TheoryUpdated 16 Nov 2026

The Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) is the part of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) under which the ECB and the national central banks of the Eurosystem buy bonds issued by euro area governments, public agencies and European supranational institutions. Announced in January 2015 and started in March of that year, it was by far the largest component of the APP and the main form of quantitative easing in the euro area.

The programme was designed to counter the risk of a long period of very low inflation at a time when the ECB's key interest rates were already close to or below zero. By buying large amounts of longer-dated public debt, the Eurosystem aimed to lower long-term yields, ease financing conditions and bring inflation back in line with its price stability objective. It ran alongside smaller programmes for covered bonds, asset-backed securities and, from 2016, the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP).

01

How the programme worked

All purchases were made in the secondary market, because Article 123 of the TFEU bars the Eurosystem from buying debt directly from governments, a form of monetary financing. The main design features were:

  • Allocation by capital key. Purchases of national government bonds were split across countries broadly in line with each national central bank's share in the ECB's capital, rather than according to the size of each country's debt.
  • Decentralised buying. Each national central bank bought mainly the public sector bonds of its own country, and losses on those holdings are not shared across the Eurosystem. Only a smaller part of the portfolio, including supranational bonds and the ECB's own purchases, is subject to risk sharing.
  • Issue and issuer limits. Holdings were capped at a share of each bond issue and of each issuer's outstanding debt, to preserve market functioning and to keep the Eurosystem from becoming a dominant creditor of any government.
  • Eligibility. Bonds had to meet the Eurosystem's credit quality standards and fall within a set range of remaining maturities. Greek government bonds were never bought under the PSPP.
02

Phases of purchases and reinvestment

Combined monthly purchases under the APP started at €60 billion in March 2015, were raised to €80 billion from April 2016, and were then reduced in steps until net purchases stopped at the end of 2018. For most of 2019 the Eurosystem only reinvested the principal of maturing bonds. Net purchases restarted in November 2019 at €20 billion a month, were stepped up with an additional temporary envelope during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, and ended on 1 July 2022 as inflation rose sharply. The PSPP made up the large majority of these purchases, and its holdings came to exceed €2 trillion.

After net buying ended, maturing bonds were reinvested in full until the end of February 2023, then only in part, and from July 2023 not at all. Since then the portfolio has shrunk as bonds mature, a gradual process often described as passive quantitative tightening.

03

Effects and side effects

Studies by the ECB and academic researchers generally found that the PSPP lowered euro area sovereign yields and the term premium, weakened the euro and supported lending and inflation, although estimates of the size of these effects vary. The purchases also created large excess reserves in the banking system, which pushed overnight money market rates down towards the deposit facility rate. Critics pointed to side effects: compressed yields that reduced market pressure on governments, scarcity of some bonds as collateral in repo markets, weaker bond market liquidity and higher asset prices that benefited wealthier households most.

The PSPP faced a major legal challenge in Germany. In the Weiss case, the German Federal Constitutional Court asked the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2017 whether the programme breached the ban on monetary financing or went beyond the ECB's monetary policy mandate. The CJEU ruled in December 2018 that it did not.

In a judgment of 5 May 2020, the German court nonetheless held that the ECB had not shown that it had weighed the programme's economic side effects against its monetary aims, declared the CJEU ruling to be beyond that court's powers on this point, and said the Bundesbank could no longer take part unless the Governing Council demonstrated proportionality within three months. Documents on the ECB's assessment were made available, the German government and parliament judged them sufficient, and the Bundesbank continued to participate. The episode raised wider questions about the primacy of EU law, and the European Commission opened infringement proceedings against Germany in 2021, which it later closed.

Last updated 16 Nov 2026