Price discrimination is the practice of selling the same good or service to different buyers at different prices, where the price gap does not reflect a difference in the cost of supplying them. Airline seats, cinema tickets with student discounts, software sold in basic and professional versions, and loan rates that vary by customer segment all involve forms of it. The aim is to capture more of what buyers are willing to pay than a single price would allow.
The idea sits within the study of market structure and market power: only a firm that can set its own price, such as a monopoly or a firm in an oligopoly, can price discriminate. The British economist Arthur Pigou set out the classic three-way classification in The Economics of Welfare (1920). The term is descriptive rather than a judgement: many forms are legal and some widen access to a product, while others are restricted by competition law.
Conditions for price discrimination
- Market power. The seller must face a downward-sloping demand curve and be able to set price above marginal cost.
- Segmentation. The seller must be able to tell buyers apart, directly (age, location, membership) or indirectly by letting buyers sort themselves through the options they choose.
- No resale. Buyers who pay low prices must be unable to resell to those charged high prices; otherwise arbitrage erodes the price gap. Services, tickets tied to a name and digital licences are easy to protect.
First, second and third degree
First-degree, or perfect, price discrimination charges each buyer exactly their willingness to pay. The seller captures all consumer surplus, but output reaches the efficient level because every unit worth more than its cost is sold. It is rare in pure form, though individual bargaining, auctions and data-driven personalised offers move in that direction.
Second-degree price discrimination offers a menu of prices that depend on quantity or version, and lets buyers choose. Volume discounts, two-part tariffs (a fixed fee plus a per-unit charge), and "basic" and "premium" product tiers are examples. Bank account packages and card schemes with different fee levels for low- and high-volume merchants often work this way.
Third-degree price discrimination charges different prices to identifiable groups, such as students, pensioners, business travellers or customers in different countries. The firm sets a higher price for the group whose demand is less elastic. Related tactics include dynamic pricing, loyalty programmes and targeted coupons.
The pricing rule for separate markets
In third-degree discrimination the profit-maximising firm sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost in each segment. Marginal revenue can be written in terms of the price elasticity of demand:
- is the price charged in segment .
- is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand in that segment.
- is the marginal cost, assumed the same for every segment.
Suppose marginal cost is 20. In segment A, business travellers, demand elasticity is 2, so and . In segment B, leisure travellers, elasticity is 4, so and . Checking: and . The less price-sensitive group pays 50% more.
Welfare effects
The effects on society are mixed. Price discrimination transfers surplus from buyers to sellers, which raises fairness concerns. But it can also increase total output: a single-price monopolist leaves out low-value buyers, while a discriminating seller may serve them at a lower price, reducing deadweight loss. Discounted medicines in poorer countries and off-peak fares are often cited as cases where discrimination widens access. Whether total welfare rises depends largely on whether output expands. A common finding in the literature is that third-degree discrimination which does not increase total output reduces welfare, because the same quantity is shared out less efficiently among buyers. Personalised online pricing based on browsing data has revived these debates, since it brings sellers closer to first-degree discrimination than was previously possible.
Legal treatment
In the United States, the Clayton Act of 1914, as amended by the Robinson–Patman Act of 1936, restricts price discrimination between competing business buyers of commodities where it harms competition, and enforcement sits with the Federal Trade Commission and private litigants. In the European Union, Article 102 TFEU treats discriminatory pricing by a dominant firm as a possible abuse, and in the United Kingdom the Competition and Markets Authority applies similar rules. Consumer protection and anti-discrimination laws separately bar pricing based on protected characteristics, and regulators increasingly examine personalised pricing in insurance and lending.
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