Mutualization of risk is the sharing of losses among the members of a financial market infrastructure, most often a central counterparty (CCP), when a defaulting member's own resources are not enough to cover what it owes. Instead of each member bearing only the risk of its own positions, the surviving clearing members collectively absorb the remaining loss through their contributions to a common fund and, if needed, further calls on their resources.
Mutualization is what turns a clearing house from a simple intermediary into a risk-sharing arrangement. It allows a CCP to withstand the failure of a large participant without requiring every member to post margin sized for the most extreme scenarios on its own account, but it also means that each member's safety depends partly on the conduct and risk management of the others. The Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, published by the CPMI and IOSCO in 2012, set out how much a CCP must be able to withstand and how losses should be allocated.
The default waterfall
A CCP uses its resources in a fixed order, known as the default waterfall. A typical sequence is:
- The defaulter's initial margin and any other collateral it has posted are used first.
- The defaulter's own contribution to the default fund is used next.
- A dedicated slice of the CCP's own capital, known as skin in the game, absorbs the following loss.
- The default fund contributions of non-defaulting members are then drawn on.
- Further assessments, which are calls on surviving members up to a capped amount, may follow.
- Recovery tools set out in the CCP's rulebook, such as variation margin gains haircutting or partial tear-up of contracts, come last.
The first two layers are paid by the defaulter alone, a principle often summarised as "defaulter pays". Mutualization begins at the fourth layer, once the CCP's own tranche has been used up.
Sizing the mutualised fund
The default fund is sized through regular stress testing under extreme but plausible market conditions. Under the PFMI, a CCP that is systemically important in more than one jurisdiction or that clears products with a more complex risk profile should hold enough financial resources to cover the default of the two participants, together with their affiliates, that would cause the largest aggregate credit exposure in such conditions. This standard is known as "cover 2"; other CCPs should at least cover the largest single participant. In the European Union, EMIR applies a cover 2 standard to all authorised CCPs.
Each member's contribution is usually proportional to the risk it brings, measured by its margin requirement or by its losses under stress, and contributions are recalculated periodically. Members that increase their positions therefore pay more into the fund, and the fund grows or shrinks with the overall risk cleared.
Benefits of mutualization
Pooling resources has several advantages:
- Efficiency. Collateral that would otherwise be held separately by each member covers tail risk for the whole membership, which lowers the total amount needed for a given level of protection.
- Confidence. A large shared fund signals that the CCP can survive a major default, which supports trading and helps contain systemic risk.
- Incentives to monitor. Because members lose money if another member defaults, they have reasons to scrutinise membership standards, margin models and the CCP's default management process, in which they often take part by bidding in auctions of the defaulter's portfolio.
Concerns and debates
Mutualization also creates problems. It can produce moral hazard: members whose losses are shared may take more risk than they would if they bore it alone, and a CCP may set margins lower than is prudent if it can rely on member resources. Members cannot fully control the risk they underwrite, since they do not choose who else joins or how others trade. Assessments tend to be called at the worst moment, during market stress, and can pass strain from one firm to others, adding to procyclicality.
These concerns have fuelled debate about the size of the CCP's own contribution. Clearing members and buy-side firms have argued for larger skin-in-the-game tranches, so that CCP owners, often listed exchange groups, share more of the risk and have stronger incentives to manage it. CCPs reply that members' contributions reflect the risk they bring and that the default fund should remain mainly a members' resource. The 2018 default of a single trader-member in the Nordic power market cleared by Nasdaq Clearing, which used up a large part of the mutualised default fund, is often cited in this debate. Regulators have also focused on CCP recovery and resolution, so that losses beyond the waterfall can be allocated predictably without public support.
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