Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deal terms and takeover tactics are the contract clauses, legal doctrines and market practices that govern how one company buys another. They are used by boards, bidders, investment banks, lawyers and buyout firms, and they shape how a bid is launched, how a target's board of directors must respond and how the final contract shares risk between the parties.
The members of this family sit at different points of a transaction. A Saturday night special is a historic way of launching a hostile tender offer. The Revlon rule sets the duty of a target's board once a sale is under way. A no-shop clause restricts the target after it signs with a buyer, the sale and purchase agreement is the contract that records the deal, and staple financing is a funding package that a seller's adviser offers to bidders in an auction. Together they cover the path from first approach to completion.
Saturday Night Special (Takeover)
A Saturday night special was a hostile takeover tactic of the 1960s in which a bidder made a surprise public takeover offer for a company's shares, often announced at a weekend, with a very short deadline. Shareholders had little time to judge the price, and the target's board had little time to find alternatives or a rival bidder. Offers were often for only part of the shares on a first-come basis, which pressed holders to sell quickly rather than risk being left in a minority. The tactic was largely ended in the United States by the Williams Act of 1968, which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It requires a bidder to disclose its identity, funding and plans, lets shareholders withdraw tendered shares, and requires pro rata purchases when a partial offer is oversubscribed. Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission require a tender offer to stay open for at least 20 business days. The term now survives mainly as a historical label.
Revlon Rule
The Revlon rule is a doctrine of Delaware corporate law set out by the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (1986). It holds that once the sale or break-up of a company has become inevitable, the directors' role changes from defending the company to obtaining the best price reasonably available for shareholders, in effect acting as auctioneers. In the case, Revlon's board resisted a hostile bid from Pantry Pride and favoured a white knight, Forstmann Little, with a lock-up option and other deal protections, which the court set aside. In practice Revlon duties apply when a transaction involves a change of control, such as a sale for cash. Courts then review the board's process under enhanced scrutiny rather than the more deferential business judgment rule. The doctrine is often contrasted with Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum (1985), which governs defences against a hostile bid and requires them to be reasonable in relation to the threat. Both apply directors' fiduciary duties.
No-Shop Clause
A no-shop clause is a term in a merger agreement or letter of intent that bars the target from soliciting, encouraging or negotiating competing offers once it has agreed a deal. It protects a buyer that has spent time and money on due diligence and financing from being used only to draw out a higher bid. Because the target's board still owes duties to shareholders, public-company agreements usually include a fiduciary out: the board may respond to an unsolicited proposal that is, or could lead to, a superior offer, and may change its recommendation or terminate, usually on paying a break-up fee to the first buyer. A softer form, sometimes called a window-shop clause, lets the target talk to unsolicited bidders without seeking them out. The opposite is a go-shop provision, which gives the target a set period after signing, often about a month, to look actively for better offers, typically with a lower break-up fee for bidders found in that window. Go-shops are common in private equity take-privates.
Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA)
A sale and purchase agreement (SPA) is the main contract in an acquisition, setting out what is sold, the price and how it is paid, the conditions to completion and the allocation of risk. In a share purchase the buyer acquires the shares of the target company and takes it with all its assets and liabilities; in an asset purchase it buys selected assets and assumes only agreed liabilities. Typical terms include representations and warranties about the business, indemnities for specific risks, conditions precedent such as regulatory approval, and sometimes a material adverse change clause. Price mechanics usually follow one of two models. Completion accounts adjust the price after closing to reflect actual net debt and working capital at completion. A locked box fixes the price by reference to an earlier balance sheet, with protection against value leaking to the seller in between. In commodity markets an SPA is also a contract to supply a commodity, such as liquefied natural gas, over a period.
Staple Financing
Staple financing is a pre-arranged debt package that the adviser running a sale auction, or its lending arm, offers to all prospective bidders, its terms figuratively stapled to the sale documents. It is most common when the seller expects financial buyers who will fund a leveraged buyout largely with debt. For the seller, a staple speeds up the process, signals how much debt the business can support and so helps set a floor for bids, and lets bidders with weaker access to leveraged finance compete. Bidders are not obliged to use it and often arrange cheaper funding elsewhere, keeping the staple as a fallback. The practice raises conflict-of-interest concerns: an adviser earning fees both for selling the company and for lending to the buyer may favour a bidder that uses its financing over the one offering the best price. The Delaware Court of Chancery criticised such a conflict in the Del Monte Foods case of 2011, and boards now usually require disclosure and safeguards when their adviser offers staple financing.
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