Inflation expectations are the beliefs that households, businesses and investors hold about how fast prices will rise in the future. Expected inflation matters because people act on it today: workers ask for pay rises that keep up with the prices they foresee, firms set prices with future costs in mind, and lenders demand interest rates that protect the real value of their money. Expectations can therefore help bring about the very inflation they predict.
Central banks treat expectations as one of the most important indicators they follow. A regime of inflation targeting works best when the public believes the target will be met, so that a temporary price shock does not feed into lasting wage and price increases. Expectations are usually split by horizon, such as one year ahead or five to ten years ahead, and by who holds them: households, professional forecasters or financial markets.
Why expectations matter for prices and interest rates
Expectations link today's decisions to tomorrow's prices through several channels. In wage bargaining, unions and employers settle pay for a year or more, so the inflation rate both sides expect is built into the contract; some contracts also contain a cost-of-living adjustment. In price setting, firms that adjust prices only occasionally set them with expected future costs in mind. In credit markets, expected inflation is the gap between the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate, so higher expected inflation pushes up borrowing costs on mortgages, loans and bonds.
Economic theory gives expectations a central role. The expectations-augmented Phillips curve, developed by Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps in the late 1960s, holds that unemployment can be pushed below its natural rate only by inflation that exceeds what people expect, and that the effect fades once expectations catch up. Under adaptive expectations, people forecast by looking at past inflation; under rational expectations, they use all available information, including what the central bank says it will do.
How inflation expectations are measured
There are two broad families of measures. Surveys ask people directly. Well-known examples include the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Survey of Consumer Expectations, the Survey of Professional Forecasters, and the Bank of England's Inflation Attitudes Survey. Household surveys tend to show higher and more scattered expectations than surveys of economists, and they react strongly to prices people see often, such as food and fuel.
Market-based measures infer expectations from asset prices. The most common is breakeven inflation, the difference between the yield on an ordinary government bond and the yield on an inflation-indexed bond of the same maturity, such as US Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS):
Here is the breakeven inflation rate, is the yield on the conventional bond and is the real yield on the inflation-linked bond. If a ten-year Treasury note yields 4.3 per cent and a ten-year TIPS yields 2.0 per cent, breakeven inflation is per cent a year. An investor expecting inflation above 2.3 per cent would prefer TIPS; one expecting less would prefer the ordinary note. Prices of inflation-linked swaps give a similar reading. Breakevens are not pure forecasts, because they also contain an inflation risk premium and reflect differences in liquidity between the two bonds.
Anchored and unanchored expectations
Expectations are said to be anchored when long-term expectations stay close to the central bank's target even when current inflation moves away from it. Anchoring gives policymakers room to look through temporary shocks, such as a jump in oil prices, without raising interest rates sharply. Central banks try to build it through clear targets, independence and communication tools such as forward guidance.
When expectations become unanchored, they drift with actual inflation. The United States in the 1970s is the standard example: repeated bursts of inflation raised expected inflation, which fed into wages and prices and produced stagflation. Restoring credibility required very high interest rates under Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker from 1979, and a deep recession in the early 1980s.
The wage-price spiral
A wage-price spiral is a self-reinforcing loop in which higher expected prices lead workers to seek higher wages, higher wages raise firms' costs and prices, and higher prices raise expectations again. Economists debate how often true spirals occur; many episodes of high wage growth end without one, especially when expectations remain anchored. The risk of a spiral is a main reason the Federal Open Market Committee and other monetary policy committees watch both survey and market measures when setting monetary policy.
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