The fiscal multiplier is the ratio of a change in national output to the change in government spending or taxation that caused it. A multiplier of 1.5 on government spending means that each additional dollar spent by the government raises gross domestic product (GDP) by 1.5 dollars. A multiplier below one means that the extra spending displaces some private activity. Economists estimate separate multipliers for spending and for tax changes, and for different time horizons.
The idea comes from Keynesian economics. Richard Kahn set out an employment multiplier in 1931, and John Maynard Keynes made the income multiplier central to his 1936 General Theory. It is a specific case of the wider multiplier effect and should not be confused with the money multiplier of banking. The size of the fiscal multiplier is central to debates about fiscal stimulus in recessions and about austerity when governments cut deficits.
How the multiplier works
When the government spends more, for example on building a road, the contractors and workers it pays receive income. They spend part of that income on goods and services, which becomes income for other firms and workers, who in turn spend part of it, and so on. Each round is smaller than the last because some income is saved, paid in taxes or spent on imports. The total rise in output is the sum of all these rounds.
The share of extra income that households spend is the marginal propensity to consume (MPC), a central part of the Keynesian consumption function. The higher the MPC, the larger each round of spending and the larger the multiplier.
Formulas and worked examples
In the simplest closed-economy model with no taxes on income, the government spending multiplier is:
where is the change in output and the change in government spending. With an MPC of 0.8, , so an increase in spending of 10 billion raises output by 50 billion in this textbook case.
A tax cut works more weakly, because households save part of the first round:
With the same MPC, : a tax cut of 10 billion raises output by 40 billion. An equal rise in spending and taxes therefore raises output by the amount of the spending, the balanced-budget multiplier of one.
Adding a tax rate on income and a marginal propensity to import introduces leakages:
With MPC 0.8, and , the denominator is , so . Real-world estimates are smaller still, because the simple model ignores interest rates, prices and expectations.
Why the size varies
Empirical estimates of spending multipliers range from well below one to above two, depending on conditions. The main influences are:
- Economic slack. Multipliers tend to be larger in a recession, when idle workers and machines can be drawn into use, than near full employment.
- Monetary policy. If the central bank raises interest rates to offset the stimulus, private investment falls, an effect known as crowding out. At the zero lower bound, when rates cannot fall further and the central bank is unlikely to raise them, multipliers are thought to be larger.
- Openness. In small open economies much of the extra demand leaks abroad through imports.
- Exchange rate regime. Fiscal policy tends to be more powerful under a fixed exchange rate than under a floating one.
- Public debt and expectations. Where debt is high, stimulus may raise borrowing costs or prompt households to save in expectation of future taxes, the logic of Ricardian equivalence.
Estimates and the austerity debate
Measuring multipliers is difficult because fiscal policy itself responds to the state of the economy. Researchers use methods such as narrative records of tax changes and defence spending driven by wars, comparisons across regions, and structural models. The results feed directly into budget forecasts made by finance ministries and international bodies.
The debate intensified after 2010, when several European governments cut deficits during weak recoveries. In 2013 Olivier Blanchard and Daniel Leigh of the International Monetary Fund found that growth forecasts had underestimated the drag from fiscal consolidation, implying that multipliers had been larger than assumed in the early years of the crisis. Others argue that consolidation can be less damaging when it relies on spending cuts, is credible and is accompanied by easier monetary policy. The multiplier remains one of the most contested numbers in macroeconomics.
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