Environmental policy instruments are the tools governments use to reduce pollution and other environmental harm. Most pollution is a negative externality: the polluter does not pay the full cost of the damage, so markets produce too much of it. Policy instruments try to close that gap, either by setting rules directly or by changing prices so that firms and households take the damage into account.
The members of this family fit together. Command-and-control regulation sets limits and technology rules. The polluter pays principle is the guiding idea that those who cause damage should bear its cost, often put into practice through a Pigouvian tax, a carbon tax or emissions trading. A Pigouvian subsidy is the mirror image, rewarding activities with positive spillovers. Abatement is the act of cutting pollution, and the marginal abatement cost curve ranks the ways of doing so by cost, helping policymakers find the cheapest cuts first.
Command-and-Control Regulation
Command-and-control regulation is the approach in which a government sets a specific environmental standard and requires every regulated firm to meet it, under threat of penalties. Standards can be performance limits, such as a maximum amount of a pollutant per unit of output, or technology mandates, such as requiring catalytic converters on cars or scrubbers on power station chimneys. Much early environmental law took this form, including the US Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act of the 1970s.
The approach is easy to understand, gives certainty about what each firm must do, and suits dangerous pollutants where a firm limit is needed. Its weakness is cost. Because every firm must meet the same rule, it ignores the fact that some firms can cut pollution far more cheaply than others, so a given total reduction costs more than under market-based tools such as emissions taxes or tradable permits. Technology mandates can lock in today's methods, and regulators need detailed industry knowledge, so poorly designed rules risk government failure.
Polluter Pays Principle
The polluter pays principle states that whoever causes pollution should bear the cost of preventing, controlling or repairing it, rather than taxpayers or the people harmed. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted it as a guiding principle in 1972, partly to stop governments subsidizing their industries' pollution control and distorting trade. It was later written into the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development as Principle 16, and into European Union law.
In economic terms the principle calls for internalizing the externality: once the polluter faces the cost of the damage, it will cut pollution up to the point where the marginal cost of a further cut equals the marginal damage avoided. It is applied through pollution taxes, charges for waste and discharges, permit schemes such as the EU Emissions Trading System, and liability laws such as the US Superfund law of 1980. Critics note that costs are often passed on to consumers and that historic pollution may have no polluter left to pay.
Pigouvian Subsidy
A Pigouvian subsidy is a government payment to producers or users of a good that creates benefits for others, set so that private output rises to the level that is best for society. It is named after the English economist Arthur Cecil Pigou, whose 1920 book The Economics of Welfare analyzed the gap between private and social costs and benefits. It is the mirror image of the Pigouvian tax: the tax adds the external cost to the price of a harmful activity, while the subsidy adds the external benefit to the reward for a helpful one.
Without support, activities with a positive externality are underprovided, because those who undertake them capture only part of the gains. Standard examples are basic research and development, vaccination, which also protects the unvaccinated, and early renewable energy, whose adopters lower costs for later users. Subsidies take the form of grants, tax credits, rebates or guaranteed prices such as a feed-in tariff. The difficulty is measuring the external benefit, which leaves room for overpayment and lobbying.
Abatement
Abatement means reducing or removing pollution or other environmental damage: cutting emissions at the source, capturing pollutants before release, or cleaning up damage afterwards. In climate policy it usually refers to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, measured in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. Abatement policy is the set of rules and incentives designed to bring it about, from emission limits to carbon prices.
Abatement has a cost, such as new equipment, cleaner fuels or lower output, and the cost of each extra tonne usually rises as the cheapest options are used up. Economic efficiency calls for abatement up to the point where the marginal abatement cost equals the marginal damage avoided, with the cuts made by whoever can make them most cheaply. That is the case for carbon taxes and tradable permits, which give every emitter the same price per tonne and so equalize marginal abatement costs across firms. Who finally pays, whether shareholders, workers, consumers or taxpayers, depends on how far costs can be passed on in prices.
Marginal Abatement Cost Curve
A marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) is a chart that ranks the available ways of cutting emissions from cheapest to most expensive per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. Each measure is shown as a bar: its width is the amount of emissions it can abate in a given year and its height is its cost per tonne. Read from left to right, the bars form a rising curve showing how much abatement is available at each carbon price. The best-known global greenhouse gas abatement cost curves were published by the consultancy McKinsey from 2007, and many governments produce their own.
Such curves typically show some measures, such as building insulation or efficient lighting, at negative cost, meaning they save money over their life, and others, such as carbon capture, at the expensive end. Policymakers use them, alongside cost-benefit analysis, to decide which measures to back first and what carbon price would meet a target for limiting climate change. Their limits are well known: they rely on uncertain forecasts, treat measures as independent when they interact, ignore the hidden costs that explain why apparently profitable savings go unused, and date quickly as technology costs decline.
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