The dual mandate is the pair of monetary policy goals that the US Congress has given the Federal Reserve System (The Fed): maximum employment and stable prices. The wording comes from a 1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, which directs the Fed to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates. The Federal Open Market Committee, which sets the policy rate, uses the mandate as the yardstick for its decisions and its public explanations.
Although the statute lists three goals, the phrase "dual mandate" is standard because moderate long-term rates are expected to follow when prices are stable and the economy is near full employment. Many central banks have a different legal setup. Some, such as the European Central Bank, have a single primary objective of price stability, with other goals secondary. Others combine price and employment aims in different ways. The US version is unusual in giving employment equal statutory weight.
Legal basis and history
The Federal Reserve Act (1913) originally said little about economic goals; the Fed's early purpose was to provide an elastic currency and a lender for banks under strain. The Employment Act of 1946 committed the federal government as a whole to promoting maximum employment, production and purchasing power. After the high inflation and unemployment of the 1970s, the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977 wrote the current goals into the Fed's own statute. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, added reporting duties, including semi-annual testimony by the Chair to Congress, which continues today.
Congress sets the goals but not the methods. The Fed has operational independence to choose how to pursue them, an arrangement discussed under central bank independence.
How the FOMC interprets the goals
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) gives the mandate concrete meaning in its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, first adopted in January 2012 and reviewed periodically since. The two halves are treated differently:
- Stable prices. The Committee judges that inflation of 2 per cent a year, measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent with the mandate over the longer run. Officials often watch the core PCE price index as a guide to the trend.
- Maximum employment. The Committee does not set a fixed numerical target, because the highest sustainable level of employment depends largely on non-monetary factors such as demographics and skills, changes over time and cannot be measured directly. It looks at a broad range of labor market indicators, including the unemployment rate, participation and wage growth.
In August 2020 the Committee adopted a framework of flexible average inflation targeting, aiming for inflation moderately above 2 per cent for some time after periods below it, and describing employment in terms of shortfalls from its maximum level. A further review concluded in 2025 returned to a more conventional flexible inflation-targeting approach.
Balancing the two goals
Most of the time the goals point the same way. When demand is weak, unemployment rises and inflation tends to fall, so lowering the federal funds rate supports both. Conflict arises with supply shocks, such as an oil price jump, which can push inflation up while weakening employment. This is the problem of stagflation. In such cases the FOMC says it takes a balanced approach, weighing how far each goal is from its objective and how long each might take to return.
Economic models help frame the trade-off. The Phillips curve links inflation to labor market slack, and estimates of the natural rate of unemployment indicate where employment might be sustainable. Policy rules such as the Taylor rule, which set the policy rate according to the inflation gap and the output gap, are one way of expressing a dual mandate in numbers, though the Fed uses them only as references.
Comparison with other central banks
Legal mandates vary widely. The European Central Bank (ECB) has price stability as its primary objective under the EU treaties, and may support general economic policies only without prejudice to that aim. The Bank of England (BoE) must maintain price stability and, subject to that, support the government's economic policy, including growth and employment; the government sets the inflation target. The Reserve Bank of Australia has long had objectives covering both price stability and full employment. New Zealand added a maximum employment objective in 2018 and later returned to a single focus on price stability.
Supporters of the US approach argue that it keeps the human cost of unemployment in view and gives policy flexibility in recessions. Critics argue that a single price-stability goal gives clearer accountability, and that monetary policy cannot permanently raise employment. In practice, central banks with formal inflation targeting regimes usually also pay close attention to output and jobs, so the gap between dual and single mandates is smaller in operation than in law.
External links
Ref 1100001777