Central bank independence is the legal and practical protection that allows a central bank to pursue its objectives and carry out its tasks without taking instructions from, or being pressured by, governments, parliaments or other political bodies. It covers who appoints and can dismiss the bank's leaders, who decides monetary policy, and who controls the bank's budget. Most advanced and many emerging economies granted their central banks some form of independence between the late 1980s and the early 2000s.
The idea is closely tied to price stability. A government facing an election or a heavy debt load may be tempted to keep interest rates too low or to have the central bank finance its spending, which tends to produce inflation. Placing monetary decisions with an independent body that has a clear mandate is meant to remove that temptation. Independence does not mean the central bank is unaccountable: it is usually paired with a narrow legal mandate, transparency duties and regular reporting to parliament.
Forms of independence
Legal studies and central bank reports usually separate independence into four parts:
- Institutional independence. The bank and the members of its decision-making bodies may not seek or accept instructions from governments or other outside bodies, and those bodies must not try to influence them.
- Functional independence. The bank has a clearly defined primary objective and the powers and instruments needed to pursue it, and decides on their use itself.
- Personal independence. Governors and board members serve fixed and reasonably long terms and can only be dismissed for serious misconduct or for no longer meeting the conditions of office, not for policy disagreements.
- Financial independence. The bank has its own budget and resources, so a government cannot weaken it by withholding funds or by draining its capital.
A common further distinction is between goal independence, where the bank sets its own target, and instrument independence, where the target is set politically but the bank chooses how to reach it. The Bank of England, for example, has instrument independence: the government sets the inflation target and the Monetary Policy Committee sets interest rates.
The economic case
The modern argument rests on the problem of time inconsistency described by Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott in 1977 and applied to monetary policy by Robert Barro and David Gordon in 1983. A policymaker who promises low inflation has an incentive, once wages and prices are set, to create a surprise burst of inflation to boost output briefly. Because the public anticipates this, inflation ends up higher without any lasting gain in output. Kenneth Rogoff argued in 1985 that delegating policy to a "conservative" central banker who weighs inflation more heavily than society does could reduce this bias.
Empirical work in the early 1990s, notably by Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, found that advanced economies whose central banks scored higher on indices of legal independence had lower average inflation, with no clear cost in growth. Later research showed that legal independence can differ from practice, particularly in developing economies, where measures such as the turnover rate of governors predicted inflation better. The case for independence also supports the rise of inflation targeting, which gives an independent bank a clear and measurable goal.
Independence of the ECB and the Eurosystem
The European Central Bank (ECB) has one of the strongest legal guarantees of independence in the world, because it is set out in the EU treaties rather than in ordinary law. Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies may seek or take instructions from EU institutions, member state governments or any other body, and that those bodies undertake not to influence them. Article 123 adds a ban on monetary financing of governments.
Members of the Executive Board (ECB) serve single, non-renewable eight-year terms. Governors of the national central banks, who sit on the Governing Council (ECB), must have a term of at least five years and can be dismissed only on limited grounds, with a right of appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Because these rules bind every national central bank in the Eurosystem, a country that wants to adopt the euro must bring its central bank law into line, a test known as legal convergence.
Accountability and limits
Independence is balanced by accountability. The ECB publishes an annual report, explains its decisions at press conferences and in accounts of its meetings, and its President appears regularly before the European Parliament. Other central banks report to their legislatures in similar ways.
Critics raise several points. Delegating powerful decisions to unelected officials creates a democratic deficit, which grows as central banks take on bond purchases, financial stability and climate-related work that have clear distributional effects. Large holdings of government debt can blur the line between monetary and fiscal policy and raise fears of fiscal dominance. Courts have also tested the limits of the mandate: in May 2020 the German Federal Constitutional Court questioned the proportionality of the ECB's Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), a ruling that conflicted with an earlier judgment of the CJEU. Supporters reply that independence remains the best protection against inflation, provided mandates are clear and the bank is transparent about how it uses its powers.