Dual economies and catch-up development are a family of ideas in development economics that explain how poorer countries can grow quickly. They start from the observation that many low-income economies have two very different parts: a small modern sector of factories, mines and offices with high output per worker, and a large traditional sector of small farms and informal work with low output per worker. Moving workers from the second to the first raises average incomes even before any new technology is invented.
Development economists, historians and policymakers use these ideas to explain rapid economic growth in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China, and its absence elsewhere. The dual economy and surplus labor describe the starting point; catch-up growth describes the advantage of borrowing technology already in use in richer countries; and the developmental state describes governments that steered the process through credit, trade and industrial policy.
Dual Economy
A dual economy is an economy split into a modern, capitalist sector and a traditional or subsistence sector. The modern sector hires workers for wages, uses capital and sells in markets; the traditional sector, often family farming or the informal economy, shares output among its members and uses little capital. The idea is most associated with the economist W. Arthur Lewis, whose 1954 paper on economic development with unlimited supplies of labor set out the dual-sector model. In it, the modern sector can expand by hiring workers from the traditional sector at a wage only a little above subsistence, reinvesting its profits and growing further. Growth continues in this way until the pool of spare labor is used up. That moment, when modern-sector wages must start rising to attract more workers, is known as the Lewis turning point. Economists have debated whether China reached it in the 2000s or 2010s.
Surplus Labor
Surplus labor is labor whose removal from an activity would not reduce that activity's output. The classic example is a family farm with more members than the land needs: if one son moves to a city factory, the remaining family can still bring in the same harvest by working a little harder or more efficiently. The extra workers are sometimes described as being in disguised unemployment, since they appear to have work but add almost nothing to output. In the Lewis dual-sector model of 1954, surplus labor is what allows the modern sector to grow for a long time without bidding up wages, so profits stay high and fund more investment. Critics argue that true zero-productivity labor is rare, because farms need extra hands at planting and harvest. Many economists therefore speak of low-productivity labor, a large share of which shows up as informal employment in cities as well as on farms.
Catch-Up Growth
Catch-up growth is the tendency of poorer economies to grow faster than richer ones because they can adopt technology, management methods and machinery that already exist instead of inventing them. A country far behind the frontier gains a lot from each factory it builds and each technique it copies, while a rich country can grow only as fast as new ideas appear, the subject of endogenous growth theory. The prediction that poor countries will close the gap in per capita income is called convergence. Absolute convergence, in which all poor countries catch up, is not seen in the data. Conditional convergence, in which countries with similar savings, education and institutions converge, has more support. Japan after 1950, South Korea and Taiwan from the 1960s and China after 1978 are the standard examples; many countries in Africa and Latin America did not catch up over the same period, which shows the process is not automatic.
Developmental State
A developmental state is a government that actively steers industrialization rather than leaving it to markets alone, while still relying on private firms to do the producing. Typical tools include national development plans, directed or subsidized credit through state-influenced banks, protection of young industries, export targets and rewards for firms that met them, and investment in education and infrastructure. The political scientist Chalmers Johnson used the term in his 1982 study of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Later writers applied it to South Korea, where the state channelled credit to large business groups, and to Taiwan and Singapore. Supporters see it as proof that industrial policy can work when officials are competent and firms face export discipline. Critics point to failures elsewhere, to waste and favouritism, and to the financial fragility that cheap directed credit helped create before the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
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