Debit valuation adjustment (DVA) is the mirror image of the credit valuation adjustment (CVA). Where CVA reduces the value of a derivative portfolio for the chance that the counterparty defaults while owing the firm money, DVA increases it for the chance that the firm itself defaults while it owes money to the counterparty. In that event the firm would pay less than the full amount, and a counterparty pricing the trade would take that into account. DVA is that benefit, valued today.
DVA is one of the derivative valuation adjustments (XVA) and is closely linked to the funding valuation adjustment (FVA), since both depend on the firm's own credit spread. It is required in accounting fair values but excluded from bank regulatory capital, and its use has long been debated because it lets a firm report gains when its own creditworthiness worsens.
Formula
DVA is calculated in the same way as CVA, using the firm's negative exposures and its own default probability:
- is the share of the amount owed that the counterparty would lose if the firm defaulted.
- is the negative expected exposure at : the average amount the firm owes across simulated scenarios, taken as a positive number.
- is the firm's own probability of default (PD) in the interval, usually implied from its credit spread.
- is the risk-free discount factor.
When both sides' default risk is counted, the adjustment to the risk-free value is the bilateral CVA:
More precise versions weight each term by the probability that the other party has not defaulted first.
Worked example
Suppose a firm owes on a swap, with negative expected exposures of 6 million, 5 million and 3 million at the end of years one to three. Its own default probability is 0.8% a year, its LGD 60%, and discount factors are 0.97, 0.94 and 0.91. The terms are , and million, summing to 0.106 million. The DVA is million, or 63,600, which reduces the reported liability. If the counterparty's CVA on the same portfolio were 40,000, the bilateral adjustment would be a net gain to the firm of 23,600.
Accounting treatment
IFRS 13 defines the fair value of a liability as the price to transfer it to a market participant, and requires it to reflect non-performance risk, including the entity's own credit risk. Derivative liabilities are therefore valued with DVA under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and US GAAP takes the same approach. Changes in DVA on derivatives go through profit or loss. This produces the counter-intuitive result that a bank whose credit spreads widen books a gain, and one whose credit improves books a loss. Several large banks reported significant DVA gains during periods of stress around 2008 and 2011, which drew public criticism and led analysts to strip DVA out of earnings.
Regulatory treatment
Bank supervisors do not allow DVA to strengthen capital. Basel III requires banks to remove from Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) all unrealised gains and losses on fair-valued liabilities that result from changes in their own credit risk. In 2012 the Basel Committee confirmed that this applies to DVA on derivatives in full, without offsetting it against CVA. The reasoning is that a gain arising from the bank's own weaker credit cannot absorb losses when it matters, since it can be realised only by defaulting.
Hedging and criticism
DVA is hard to hedge. A firm cannot buy or sell credit protection on itself, so desks use proxies, such as selling credit default swap (CDS) protection on peer banks or an index, which leaves basis risk and adds exposure to the sector. Some argue that DVA is a real economic quantity, because counterparties price the firm's default risk into the trades they accept. Others argue that it is largely illusory for the firm's shareholders, and that the benefit of paying less in default accrues to the firm's creditors. The debate fed into the later development of FVA, which some banks treat as partly overlapping with DVA, as both reflect the firm's own spread. Collateral reduces DVA as it reduces CVA, since a fully collateralised liability leaves little to gain from default.
DVA also explains why two dealers can agree on a price. Each values the trade with its own CVA and DVA; if both use market spreads, one side's CVA equals the other's DVA, so the bilateral values are symmetric. For OTC derivatives with weaker corporate clients this symmetry is rarely exact, but it remains the basis on which counterparty risk is priced between banks under close-out netting agreements.