A contingent convertible bond, known as a CoCo, is a debt instrument that absorbs losses when the issuer gets into difficulty. If a specified event occurs, typically a fall in the issuing bank's capital ratio below a stated threshold, the bond either converts into ordinary shares or has its principal reduced. The bank's debt shrinks and its equity grows at the moment it most needs capital, without any call on public funds.
The instruments are issued chiefly by banks, mainly in Europe and Asia, to meet regulatory capital requirements, and are bought by institutional investors for their high yields. They differ from an ordinary convertible bond, where the holder chooses to convert when the share price has risen. A CoCo converts against the holder's interest, when the bank is weak. Most count as Additional Tier 1 capital, which is the regulatory category; the CoCo is the instrument that fills it.
Background
In the financial crisis of 2008, holders of bank subordinated debt and hybrid securities were largely repaid in full while governments injected capital to keep banks alive. Regulators concluded that such instruments had failed to absorb losses when it mattered. The Basel III standards, agreed from 2010, required that instruments counted as capital be able to bear losses while the bank is still operating or, at the latest, when authorities judge it non-viable. Lloyds Banking Group issued an early version in 2009, and the market grew quickly after European rules implementing the standards took effect in 2014.
How the trigger works
Loss absorption is set off by one of two kinds of trigger. A mechanical trigger is tied to the bank's Common Equity Tier 1 ratio:
The international minimum trigger for an instrument to qualify as Additional Tier 1 is 5.125 percent, and many issues use a higher level such as 7 percent. Suppose a bank has risk-weighted assets of 100 billion and common equity of 6 billion, a ratio of 6 percent, and has issued CoCos with a trigger of 5.125 percent. A loss of 1 billion cuts common equity to 5 billion and the ratio to percent, below the trigger. The bonds then convert or are written down, which lifts the ratio again.
The second kind is a discretionary trigger. The supervisor can impose losses when it determines that the bank has reached the point of non-viability, whatever the reported ratio. In practice banks have failed with reported ratios well above their mechanical triggers, and it is the discretionary trigger that has been used.
Forms of loss absorption
- Conversion to equity. The bonds are exchanged for shares at a price fixed in advance or set by a formula. Existing shareholders suffer dilution, and bondholders become owners of a troubled bank.
- Permanent write-down. The principal is cancelled in whole or in part and the holder receives nothing in return.
- Temporary write-down. The principal is reduced but may be written back up if the bank returns to profit.
Other features
Additional Tier 1 CoCos have no maturity date. The issuer may redeem them on set call dates, usually starting five years after issue, but only with the supervisor's consent, and investors bear the risk that the bond is not called, a variant of call risk in reverse. Each coupon payment is discretionary and non-cumulative: the bank may cancel it, and must do so if its capital falls into regulatory buffers, without this being a default. The bonds rank below other subordinated debt. Some CoCos with a fixed maturity qualify as Tier 2 capital instead.
Notable events
In 2017 the Additional Tier 1 bonds of Banco Popular in Spain were written off when the bank was resolved and sold. The largest case came in March 2023, when Credit Suisse was taken over by UBS in a state-supported rescue. Swiss authorities ordered the write-down to zero of about 16 billion Swiss francs of Credit Suisse Additional Tier 1 bonds, while shareholders received UBS shares. Bondholders ranking above shareholders thus lost everything while shareholders did not, reversing the normal order of claims. The contractual terms allowed a write-down on extraordinary government support, but the outcome shocked the market, and regulators in the European Union and the United Kingdom stated publicly that in their jurisdictions equity would bear losses first. Bondholders brought legal challenges in Switzerland and elsewhere. In October 2025 the Swiss Federal Administrative Court ruled that the write-down order had been unlawful, and the regulator appealed to the Federal Supreme Court.
Risks and criticism
For investors the instruments combine features that are hard to price: the chance of total loss, coupons that can be cancelled, uncertain redemption and dependence on a regulator's judgment. Yields are correspondingly well above those on a bank's senior debt. Regulators in several countries restrict sales to retail investors.
Critics doubt whether the design works as intended. Triggers based on accounting ratios react slowly and may be reached only after confidence has gone. Fear of a missed coupon or conversion can itself unsettle a bank's shares and funding, as happened with a large German bank in 2016. Academic critics argue that plain equity would be simpler and more reliable bank capital. Supporters reply that CoCos are cheaper for banks to issue, widen the investor base for loss-absorbing capital and complement the wider bail-in regime, including requirements for total loss-absorbing capacity.