Vote-escrowed tokenomics, or veTokenomics, is a design in which holders lock a protocol's tokens in a contract for a chosen period in exchange for non-transferable voting power, a share of fees and boosted rewards. It was introduced by Curve in 2020 with veCRV. A CRV holder could lock for up to four years, and voting power equals the amount locked multiplied by the remaining time divided by four years, so 1,000 CRV locked for two years gives 500 veCRV. The balance then declines steadily as the unlock date approaches.
veCRV holders vote on gauges that direct new CRV emissions to particular liquidity pools. That power became valuable to protocols wanting deep liquidity for their own tokens or stablecoins, which led to the "Curve wars": competition to accumulate veCRV, aggregators such as Convex, and markets in which projects paid holders bribes for votes. Many decentralised exchanges copied it. Critics point to illiquid lock-ups and to governance concentrated in a few large lockers.
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