A village savings and loan association (VSLA) is a self-managed group of people, usually between about 15 and 30 members, who meet regularly to save, take small loans from their pooled savings and share out the accumulated fund, with interest, at the end of a fixed cycle. The group uses no outside capital: every loan is financed by the members' own savings, and the members set the rules, the interest rate and the size of loans themselves. VSLAs are common in rural Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America, and most members are women.
The model was developed by the humanitarian organisation CARE in Niger in 1991, starting with groups known as Mata Masu Dubara, and has since been adopted and adapted by many other development agencies. It belongs to the family of savings groups and is a structured form of accumulating savings and credit association. VSLAs are part of informal finance: they are usually unregistered and unsupervised, and they reach people who are unbanked or live far from any financial provider.
How a VSLA works
Each member saves by buying shares at the group's meetings, typically held weekly. The value of one share is fixed for the whole cycle, and members may buy between one and a small maximum number of shares per meeting, which lets poorer and better-off members save at different rates. Many groups also keep a separate social fund, to which everyone contributes a small fixed amount, for grants or interest-free loans in emergencies such as illness or a funeral.
The money is kept in a lockbox secured with several padlocks, often three, whose keys are held by different members, so that it can only be opened in front of the whole group. All transactions are made openly at meetings and are recorded in individual passbooks or by memory-based methods where members cannot read. Members borrow from the loan fund for business, farming, school fees or household needs, usually for up to three months, and repay with a monthly service charge agreed by the group. A common rule limits a loan to a multiple of the borrower's own savings, often three times.
At the end of a cycle, typically 9 to 12 months, the group calls in all loans and distributes the whole fund. This share-out is sometimes called the action audit, because members can see exactly what their savings have earned. The value of each share at share-out is:
Here the total fund includes all savings plus the interest, fees and fines collected during the cycle, less any losses. Suppose 20 members together bought 1,000 shares at 100 units each, giving savings of 100,000 units, and the group collected 20,000 units in loan charges and fines. The fund is 120,000 units, so each share is worth units. A member who bought 60 shares receives units, a 20% gain on the 6,000 units saved. After the share-out the group may dissolve, or restart with new members and a new share value.
Comparison with other community-based models
A VSLA differs from a rotating savings and credit association, in which members pay a fixed sum each period and the whole pot goes to one member in turn: in a VSLA savings accumulate, members can borrow different amounts at different times, and savers earn a return. It also differs from the village banking model, in which a village bank receives loans from a sponsoring microfinance institution and repays them to it, and from the Indian self-help group, which is designed to open a bank account and borrow from a bank under a linkage programme. VSLAs are deliberately self-contained, which keeps costs low and avoids the risk of debt to outside lenders.
Linkage, digitisation and outcomes
Many mature groups now link with formal providers, opening group accounts, using mobile money to store the fund instead of a lockbox, or recording transactions with smartphone applications. Promoters see such linkage as a bridge to financial inclusion, though it brings new costs and risks. Studies of VSLAs have generally found increases in savings and in access to small loans, improved ability to cope with shocks, and gains in members' confidence and social capital, with more mixed evidence on income and poverty. Groups remain vulnerable to theft, poor record-keeping and disputes, and the money is not covered by any deposit protection.
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