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Tiered Participation

Financial InfrastructureUpdated 16 Nov 2026

Tiered participation is an arrangement in which firms that are not members of a financial market infrastructure (FMI) use its services through a member. An indirect FMI participant, such as a smaller bank, broker or payment firm, relies on a direct FMI participant to submit payments, clear trades or hold securities on its behalf. The direct participant is bound by the FMI's rules; the indirect participant is bound only by its contract with the direct participant. The structure is also called a tiering arrangement, and in payments it overlaps with correspondent banking, where one bank holds accounts for others.

Tiering is common and often efficient. Direct membership can be expensive, requiring capital, technology, liquidity in central bank money and compliance with an FMI's operational standards, so many firms prefer to buy access from a larger institution. It also creates dependencies that the FMI does not control directly. The international standard for FMIs, the PFMI, deals with these risks in Principle 19, on tiered participation arrangements.

01

How tiered arrangements work

The form of tiering depends on the type of FMI. In payment systems, an indirect participant holds an account with a direct participant, often called a settlement or agency bank, which sends payments into the system and settles them across its own account at the central bank; this is closely related to correspondent banking. At a central counterparty (CCP), clients clear through a clearing member, which guarantees their obligations to the CCP. At a central securities depository, a custodian or broker holds securities for its clients in its own participant accounts.

Some FMIs formalise the levels through distinct membership categories, discussed under FMI participation tier. China's cross-border yuan system, for example, distinguishes direct members from the indirect CIPS participant category.

02

Risks created by tiering

Tiered participation creates several kinds of risk:

  • Credit and liquidity risk between the tiers. The direct participant may extend intraday credit to its indirect participants, and a failure on either side can leave the other exposed.
  • Concentration risk. If many indirect participants rely on a few direct participants, problems at one of them can disrupt a large share of the FMI's activity.
  • Size mismatch. An indirect participant may generate activity that is large relative to its direct participant's capacity, or relative to some direct participants of the FMI itself, without facing the FMI's own risk controls.
  • Operational dependence. An outage or cyber incident at a direct participant can prevent all its indirect participants from sending payments or settling trades.

These risks can pass back to the FMI and to the wider system. A large indirect participant whose payments are delayed may hold back funds that others need, increasing pressure on intraday liquidity.

03

PFMI Principle 19

Principle 19 expects an FMI to identify, monitor and manage the material risks to it arising from tiered participation arrangements. Its key considerations include:

  • Information. The FMI should ensure that its rules and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation, so that it can identify material risks.
  • Dependencies. It should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.
  • Large indirect participants. It should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant share of transactions, and those whose volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI.
  • Review. It should regularly review the risks arising from tiering and take mitigating action where appropriate.

Principle 19 works together with Principle 18 on access and participation requirements, which says that access criteria should be fair, open and risk-based. A summary of these criteria is given under FMI access criteria.

04

Tiering in practice

Supervisors have used these principles to change market structure. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England identified high levels of tiering in its high-value payment system CHAPS as a risk in the early 2010s and encouraged large indirect participants to join directly, after which the number of direct participants rose. Clearing provides another example: the rules on client clearing, segregation and the porting of client positions are largely a response to the risks of tiered access to CCPs.

Tiering cannot be eliminated without excluding smaller firms, so the policy aim is to keep it visible and manageable. FMIs now collect data on indirect activity, set expectations for direct participants that provide access to others and include tiered arrangements in their stress testing and default procedures.

Last updated 16 Nov 2026