THORChain (RUNE)

THORChain (RUNE) is the native token of THORChain, a network that lets users swap native coins between different blockchains, for example Bitcoin (BTC) on the Bitcoin network for Ethereum (ETH) on Ethereum, without a central exchange and without wrapped tokens. RUNE is paired with every asset in the network's liquidity pools, is bonded by the node operators who run it, and is used to pay fees.

THORChain is a decentralized exchange with its own blockchain, built with the Cosmos SDK, the toolkit behind Cosmos (ATOM). It is a core part of decentralized finance for users who want to move between chains, and it is often contrasted with a crypto bridge, which locks a coin on one chain and issues a copy on another.

Imagine a currency exchange booth at a border that holds piles of several currencies, each pile paired with a pile of its own house tokens. If you hand over dollars and want euros, the booth swaps your dollars for house tokens and the house tokens for euros, then gives you real euros, not a voucher. The rate shifts automatically depending on how much of each pile is left.

THORChain works like that booth, but it is run by a rotating group of computer operators instead of a company, and the piles are crypto coins held in shared vaults on each blockchain. RUNE is the house token in the middle of every swap. Operators must put up a large deposit of RUNE, which they lose if they try to steal from the vaults.

THORChain grew out of a 2018 Binance hackathon, and RUNE was first sold in an offering on the Binance DEX in July 2019. A test version handling several chains, called Multichain Chaosnet, went live in April 2021. In July 2021 attackers exploited bugs in the code that watches Ethereum deposits twice in a week, taking about $4.9 million and then about $8 million; the treasury covered the losses. The full mainnet launched on 24 June 2022.

In January 2025 node operators paused THORFi, the network's lending and savings features, which owed users about $200 million, mostly in bitcoin and ether. In February 2025 a vote approved converting that debt into a new token, TCY, at one token per dollar owed, with TCY holders receiving 10 percent of network revenue. The same month, after the Bybit exchange lost about $1.5 billion in ether in a hack that the FBI attributed to North Korea, the hackers swapped a large share of the stolen funds into bitcoin through THORChain, driving record volumes.

Each pool holds RUNE and one other asset. Node operators, who act as validators, jointly control vaults on each connected chain and watch for deposits. A swap from bitcoin to ether is two swaps in a row: bitcoin into RUNE in one pool, then RUNE into ether in another. Instead of the fixed curve of most automated market makers, THORChain prices each leg with a formula that charges more for larger trades:

• $y$ is the amount of the asset paid out.
• $x$ is the amount put in.
• $X$ and $Y$ are the pool's depths of the input and output assets.

In a pool holding 1,000 units of each side, an input of 10 returns $10 \times 1{,}000 \times 1{,}000 \div 1{,}010^{2} \approx 9.80$ units rather than 10. The difference is the slip fee, which goes to the pool's liquidity providers, who also face impermanent loss.

RUNE once had a maximum supply of 500 million, but part of the supply was later destroyed. A governance change proposed in 2025, ADR-023, burned about 65 million RUNE from the network's reserve and cut the cap to 360 million. A share of system income is also burned on an ongoing basis. Node operators must bond RUNE worth more than the assets they secure, which ties the token's value to the network's safety. Because every pool is priced in RUNE, liquidity providers must hold RUNE alongside the asset they supply, and demand for the token rises with the total value locked in the pools. A network fee, set in RUNE terms, is also deducted when assets leave the network.

THORChain's handling of the Bybit funds drew sharp criticism. Analysts and some exchanges said the protocol had become a channel for money laundering by the North Korean Lazarus Group; a vote to halt ether trading was passed and then reversed, and at least one core developer left in protest. Supporters replied that a permissionless network cannot and should not screen users, and that blocking trades would undermine its neutrality. The episode raised questions about sanctions exposure for front ends and node operators. Other risks include past exploits, the THORFi default and the complexity of securing many chains at once.

• THORChain
• THORChain documentation