TerraUSD (UST) was an algorithmic stablecoin issued on the Terra blockchain that aimed to hold a value of one US dollar without being backed by dollars in a bank. Instead of reserves, it relied on a mint-and-burn link with Terra's native token, LUNA, and on traders arbitraging any gap between the two. At its peak UST was one of the largest stablecoins by supply, before it lost its peg in May 2022 and collapsed within days.
UST was created by Terraform Labs, a company co-founded by Do Kwon and Daniel Shin in 2018. Its failure, together with the fall of LUNA, erased an estimated 40 billion US dollars of market value and set off a chain of losses across crypto lenders and funds. It is the standard case study of the risks of an algorithmic stablecoin and strongly influenced stablecoin regulation that followed.
How the peg was meant to work
The Terra protocol allowed anyone to swap one UST for one US dollar's worth of newly created LUNA, and one dollar's worth of LUNA for one new UST, at any time. This mint-and-burn design was meant to create a profitable trade whenever the market price moved away from one dollar:
- If UST traded above one dollar, traders could burn one dollar of LUNA to mint one UST and sell it at a premium, adding UST supply and pushing the price down.
- If UST traded below one dollar, traders could buy UST cheaply and burn it for one dollar of LUNA, removing UST supply and pushing the price up.
The weakness was that LUNA itself was the only backing. Defending the peg in a downturn meant creating more LUNA, which lowered its price, which in turn required even more LUNA for each UST redeemed. This feedback loop is often called a death spiral. In early 2022 the Luna Foundation Guard, an organisation linked to Terraform Labs, built up a reserve that included a large amount of bitcoin, intended to support the peg in a crisis.
Anchor Protocol and demand for UST
Much of the demand for UST came from Anchor Protocol, a lending protocol on Terra that launched in 2021 and offered deposit yields of close to 20 per cent a year on UST. The rate was far above what the protocol earned from borrowers, and the gap was covered by subsidies. By spring 2022 most UST in circulation was deposited in Anchor, so the stablecoin's demand depended heavily on a yield that critics argued could not last. Concerns about this concentration of deposits were widely discussed before the collapse.
The May 2022 collapse
In early May 2022 large withdrawals from Anchor and large sales of UST on decentralised and centralised venues pushed UST below one dollar. Redemptions into LUNA increased the LUNA supply rapidly, its price fell, and confidence in the mechanism broke down, much as in a bank run. The reserve held by the Luna Foundation Guard was spent without restoring the peg. Within about a week UST was trading at a small fraction of a dollar, the supply of LUNA had grown into the trillions of tokens, and validators halted the Terra chain for a time.
Terraform Labs then launched a new chain under the Terra name with a new LUNA token, while the original chain was renamed Terra Classic. The depeg spread losses across the industry. Lenders and funds with exposure to UST, LUNA or the wider fall in prices, including Three Arrows Capital and Celsius Network, failed in the months that followed.
Legal aftermath
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued Terraform Labs and Do Kwon in February 2023, alleging that they had misled investors about the stability of UST and that UST and LUNA had been offered as unregistered securities. A US jury found them liable for fraud in 2024, and Terraform Labs agreed a settlement with the SEC that year before winding down. Do Kwon was arrested in Montenegro in March 2023 while travelling on false documents, was later extradited to the United States, and pleaded guilty to fraud charges in a New York federal court in 2025. In December 2025 he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. South Korean authorities also pursued their own case.
Influence on stablecoin rules
The collapse is regularly cited by regulators as evidence of the risks of stablecoins without high-quality reserves. Policy work by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and others after 2022 stressed full reserves, redemption rights and clear governance. In the European Union, the MiCA regulation requires asset-referenced and e-money tokens to hold reserves of assets. In the United States, the GENIUS Act limits permitted payment stablecoins to those backed one for one by cash and similar safe assets, which excludes designs like UST. The episode is also a standard lesson in depeg risk and in the difference between a market price peg and a legal right to redeem for dollars.
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