The standardised approach for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR) is the method set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision for calculating the exposure at default of a bank's derivative transactions when the bank does not use an approved internal model. The exposure then feeds the capital charge for counterparty credit risk, as well as the leverage ratio and large exposure limits.
The Basel Committee published the standard in March 2014. It replaced two older non-model methods, the current exposure method and the standardised method, which were criticised for failing to recognise collateral and netting properly and for being poorly calibrated to the levels of volatility seen during the 2007 to 2009 crisis. SA-CCR is designed to be more risk-sensitive while remaining simple enough for every bank to implement.
The formula
For each netting set, meaning a group of trades with one counterparty covered by a legally enforceable netting agreement, the exposure at default is:
- is a supervisory factor fixed at 1.4, carried over from the internal model framework.
- is the replacement cost, the loss the bank would suffer if the counterparty defaulted today.
- is the potential future exposure, an add-on for how much the exposure could grow over the time it would take to close out.
For an unmargined netting set, replacement cost is the current market value of the trades less net collateral held, floored at zero:
Here is the mark-to-market value of the netting set and is the haircut value of net collateral. For margined sets, replacement cost also takes account of the margin threshold and minimum transfer amount, which define how large the exposure can become before more collateral must be called.
Potential future exposure
The potential future exposure is the product of a multiplier and an aggregate add-on. Trades are assigned to five asset classes: interest rates, foreign exchange, credit, equity and commodities. Within each class, trades are grouped into hedging sets in which offsetting positions can partly or fully net. Each trade's adjusted notional is scaled by a supervisory delta, a maturity factor and a supervisory factor reflecting the volatility of its asset class, and the results are aggregated with prescribed correlations.
The multiplier lets over-collateralisation and negative market value reduce the exposure. It equals 1 when the netting set's value net of collateral is zero or positive, and falls towards a floor of 5% as the bank holds more excess collateral or the trades move further out of the money. This recognises that excess collateral protects the bank against future increases in exposure.
Worked example
Suppose an unmargined netting set has a market value of 10 million, net collateral of 4 million and an aggregate add-on of 20 million. Replacement cost is million. Because is positive, the multiplier is 1, so the potential future exposure equals the add-on of 20 million. The exposure at default is:
So the bank would hold capital against an exposure of 36.4 million, applying the counterparty's risk weight to that amount.
Implementation
National implementation took several years. In the European Union, SA-CCR was introduced by Capital Requirements Regulation 2 (CRR2) and applied from June 2021, with simplified versions available to banks with small derivative books. US banking agencies adopted it in a final rule for large banking organisations, and other Basel member jurisdictions have brought it into their own rules. Its effects matter beyond capital ratios: because SA-CCR also determines exposure measures in the leverage ratio and the large exposures framework, it affects the cost of offering client clearing and of trading with unmargined counterparties such as corporates.
Criticism
The approach has also been used outside bank capital rules. Some supervisors and market participants use SA-CCR exposure figures as a simple, comparable measure of derivative counterparty risk in reporting and in setting internal limits, because every bank calculates them in the same way. Its treatment of hedging sets, however, means that portfolios which are well hedged economically can still show sizeable add-ons when the hedges fall into different hedging sets or asset classes.
Industry groups argued that the calibration was too conservative in places, especially for FX and commodity derivatives and for unmargined end-user trades, and that the alpha factor of 1.4 should not apply to margined trades. Some jurisdictions adjusted the treatment for particular counterparties when implementing it. Supporters point to better recognition of close-out netting, margining and hedging compared with the old methods, and to more consistent results across banks under Basel III.
External links
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